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Sappho and Anacreon in Plato’s Phaedrus 
E.E. PENDER (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: Plato’s praise of the poets Sappho and Anacreon at Phaedrus 235c is 
a sincere tribute to their vivid presentations of the shock of love. Allusions to the 
lyric poets in the prologue and Socrates’ narrative of soul support Plato’s 
exploration of the relationship between mania and self-control. Plato analyses 
the power-dynamic within a soul experiencing erotic desire and in response to 
the poets creates an intricate picture of how the force and energy of eros is 
absorbed, transferred and redirected.  
1. Introduction 
At Phaedrus 235c Plato names the poets Sappho and Anacreon. Various 
interpretations of this naming have been offered over the past fifty years and the 
question of its relation to the rest of the Phaedrus has been judged ‘difficult and 
controversial’.1 I would like to contribute to this on-going discussion by 
defending the thesis that Plato names and praises Sappho and Anacreon at 235c in 
order to acknowledge their influence on his thought on love.2 While respecting 
the distinction between philosophical and other discourse, I shall argue that the 
poetry of Sappho and Anacreon provided distinctive and valuable insights that 
helped to shape Plato’s views and treatment of love. On this reading 235c offers 
an opaque but nevertheless sincere praise of the poets in order to highlight the 
influence of their insights. I therefore regard 235c as part of a technique evident in 
the dialogues at large: Plato’s use of popular or familiar ideas as the departure 
point for explorations that lead to the production of his own philosophy.  
Within the lyric vision the lover experiences the god Eros as a powerful 
external force. Phaedrus responds to this vision and reconfigures the nature of 
love. The reason why Plato pays tribute to Sappho and Anacreon is that they have 
captured and expressed so vividly the shock of love. In Phaedrus Plato details the 
power-dynamic within a soul experiencing erotic desire. By analysing the soul 
and how it functions Plato creates an intricate picture of how the force and energy 
of eros is absorbed, transferred and redirected. But throughout this alternative 
account Plato alludes to the lyric poets, recalling and reshaping their verses in line 
with his own views on the correct way to love. I shall demonstrate how poetic 
insights on the force of love are integral to Plato’s exploration of how mania and 
reason can be mutually supportive. Indeed, Plato’s allusions to Sappho and 
Anacreon create an intriguing intertextuality between the dialogue and lyric which 
challenges the well-established view of Plato as hostile to poetry. 
 
1 Foley (1998), 41.  
2 I would like to thank J.T. Wolfenden for astute comments on a previous version of this paper and 
M. Heath for expert editing. I am also grateful to the Faculty of Arts at Leeds and Professor A.S. 
Thompson for making possible my teaching relief and research leave during 2006-7. 
E.E. PENDER, SAPPHO AND ANACREON IN PLATO’S Phaedrus 
While a number of other poets and writers are named and referenced in 
Phaedrus,3 I shall deal only with the lyric poets, since the engagement with poetry 
of different types in this text is too widespread for effective treatment in a single 
paper.4 Whatever is said here about the lyric poetry of Sappho and Anacreon may 
have a bearing on Plato’s references to epic and dramatic poetry, or indeed other 
forms of Greek poetry and literature at large, but I wish to avoid hasty claims 
about those other genres or authors. While my study does indeed open up the 
broader question of Plato’s response to Greek poetry and his philosophical use of 
the literary tradition, it seems worthwhile to try to isolate and deal with the 
specifics of one particular case.5 Since Sappho and Anacreon also serve in the text 
as representatives of the lyric tradition as a whole, I shall compare Platonic 
passages not only with the verses of Sappho and Anacreon but also with those of 
Stesichorus and Ibycus, both also named in Phaedrus,6 and those of Alcaeus and 
Theognis, who are not named but who can provide further examples of the lyric 
poetry and motifs known both to Plato and his fourth-century audience. Since an 
exclusive focus on Sappho and Anacreon could distort understanding of the 
Phaedrus’ relationship with love lyric, widening the sample to a set of six poets is 
an attempt to place the Sapphic and Anacreontic material more carefully in its 
context. The fragmentary nature of the lyric corpus makes it difficult to judge 
what may or may not be identified as distinctively Sapphic or Anacreontic. But a 
review of the six poets, while it cannot determine what was specific to any 
individual, can at least better indicate which themes or motifs were shared among 
them. My aim, then, is to consider, against the background of the lyric tradition at 
large, Plato’s engagement in Phaedrus with the two specific poets named and 
praised at 235c. 
Various Sapphic and Anacreontic influences have been identified in the 
dialogue. Through a close analysis of the texts and tracing both shared vocabulary 
and broader motifs, I shall offer my own reading of Plato’s allusions to Sappho 
and Anacreon. My approach in tracing the allusions will be to follow the 
compositional structure of the dialogue. After beginning with the prologue (my 
§2) and moving ahead to the naming of the poets at 235c (§3), I shall then take the 
speeches themselves in sequence. Addressing Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first 
speech together, I shall consider the dialogue’s early treatment of the theme of 
force (§4). Finally, after a brief overview of Socrates’ second speech (§5), I shall 
                                                 
3 Homer at 243a-b and 278c2; Sophocles at 268c5 and 269a1; Euripides at 268c5; Solon at 258c1 
and 278c3; Anaxagoras 270a4-6; and Hippocrates 270c-d. In addition to Lysias and Isocrates 
(227a etc, 278e-279b), various rhetoricians, e.g. Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Prodicus, 
Hippias, and Tisias, are named (see 261c, 266c, 266e-267c, and 273a-e). The text is explicit 
throughout on its engagement with the Greek literary and rhetorical tradition. On the use of 
Stesichorus at 243a-b, see Demos (1999), 65-86.  
4 On the scale of the topic across the dialogues at large, Halliwell (2000), 94 comments: ‘In the 
case of Plato, an engagement with the culturally powerful texts and voices of poetry is so evident, 
so persistent, and so intense as to constitute a major thread running through the entire fabric of his 
writing and thinking.’ 
5 This is to take a different approach from Halliwell, who considers the ‘larger issues of evaluation 
and influence which inform so many of the strategies of citation dramatized by Plato’ (2000, 111).  
6 Ibycus at 242c8; Stesichorus at 243a5 and 244a2.  
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identify four main episodes in the narrative of the soul in love: Horses, wings and 
chariots (§5.1); Memory (§5.2); Regrowth (§5.3); and Self-control (§5.4).  
2. The prologue: an encounter with lyric 
The journey of Socrates and Phaedrus along the Ilissus dramatises the 
dialogue’s encounter with lyric poetry and contextualises the specific allusions to 
Sappho and Anacreon that will follow in the speeches on love. The Ilissus serves 
as a situational allusion to the genre of lyric by recalling the eroticised meadows 
of love poetry.7 My reading of the prologue follows Calame’s identification of 
Plato’s Boreas and Oreithuia meadow as a seduction scene of the type familiar in 
Greek myth and poetry (1999, 154-7). Calame marks out this scene as a ‘prelude 
meadow’, cites examples of similar abductions elsewhere in Greek poetry, and 
explains how these lush landscapes represent sexual initiation, especially for 
young girls at play (1999, 163-7).8  
As Socrates and Phaedrus begin their walk along the stream, it is Phaedrus 
who first points up the sensuous landscape. He notes that the stream beneath their 
feet will be ‘not unpleasant’ (oÙk ¢hdšj), especially given the season and time of 
day, and then signals the attractions of the spot to which he is guiding them 
(229a8-b2): 
Ðr´j oân ™ke…nhn t¾n Øyhlot£thn pl£tanon; ... ™ke‹ ski£ t' ™stˆn kaˆ 
pneàma mštrion, kaˆ pÒa kaq…zesqai À ¨n boulèmeqa kataklinÁnai. 
Well then, you see that very tall plane-tree? ... There’s shade and a moderate 
breeze there, and grass to sit on, or lie on, if we like. (tr. Rowe) 
When Socrates bids him to lead on, Phaedrus asks Socrates whether they are now 
on the very site of the rape of Oreithuia (229b4-6): 
FAI. e„pš moi, ð Sèkratej, oÙk ™nqšnde mšntoi poqn ¢pÕ toà 'Ilisoà 
lšgetai Ð Boršaj t¾n 'Wre…quian ¡rp£sai; 
SW. lšgetai g£r. 
Phdr: Tell me, Socrates, wasn’t it from somewhere just here that Boreas is said 
to have seized Oreithuia from the Ilissus? 
Soc: Yes, so it’s said. (tr. Rowe) 
It is difficult to catch the tone of Socrates’ two-word response but when Phaedrus 
presses, it is evident that he is trying to elicit more of a reaction from his friend 
(229b7-9): 
«r' oân ™nqšnde; car…enta goàn kaˆ kaqar¦ kaˆ diafanÁ t¦ Ød£tia 
fa…netai, kaˆ ™pit»deia kÒraij pa…zein par' aÙt£.  
                                                 
7 In Pender (2007), 66-72 I present a fuller discussion of Plato’s use of the Ilissus meadow as a 
situational allusion to the lyric genre. The term ‘situational allusion’ is taken from Hinds (1998, 
136). 
8 Calame (1999), 153-4 identifies the prelude meadow as a specific type of locus amoenus and 
observes that the ‘mythological and theological paradigm’ of an eroticised meadow occurs at 
Homer’s Iliad 14.312-51. He also compares Hesiod Theogony 276-9. On the Ilissus meadow as 
locus amoenus, see Foley (1998), 45; Rowe (1986), 141; and de Vries (1969), 56. 
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Well, was it from here? The water of the stream certainly looks attractively pure 
and clear and just right for young girls to play beside it. (tr. Rowe) 
Phaedrus is directing attention to the charms of the scene (car…enta)9 and to the 
innocent play that precedes a seduction.10 The slight innuendo seems to be 
brushed aside by Socrates and the conversation takes a different turn.  
But soon Socrates breaks off his new theme and, with evident gamesmanship, 
delivers his knowing reaction to Phaedrus’ provocative suggestion (230a6-c5): 
¢t£r, ð ˜ta‹re, metaxÝ tîn lÒgwn, «r' oÙ tÒde Ãn tÕ dšndron ™f' Óper 
Ãgej ¹m©j; ... n¾ t¾n “Hran, kal» ge ¹ katagwg». ¼ te g¦r pl£tanoj 
aÛth m£l' ¢milaf»j te kaˆ Øyhl», toà te ¥gnou tÕ Ûyoj kaˆ tÕ sÚskion 
p£gkalon, kaˆ æj ¢km¾n œcei tÁj ¥nqhj æj ¨n eÙwdšstaton paršcoi tÕn 
tÒpon: ¼ te aâ phg¾ cariest£th ØpÕ tÁj plat£nou ·e‹ m£la yucroà 
Ûdatoj, éste ge tù podˆ tekm»rasqai. Numfîn tš tinwn kaˆ 'Acelóou 
ƒerÕn ¢pÕ tîn korîn te kaˆ ¢galm£twn œoiken enai. e„ d' aâ boÚlei, tÕ 
eÜpnoun toà tÒpou æj ¢gaphtÕn kaˆ sfÒdra ¹dÚ: qerinÒn te kaˆ ligurÕn 
Øphce‹ tù tîn tett…gwn corù. p£ntwn d komyÒtaton tÕ tÁj pÒaj, Óti ™n 
ºršma pros£ntei ƒkan¾ pšfuke kataklinšnti t¾n kefal¾n pagk£lwj 
œcein. 
But, my friend, to interrupt our conversation, wasn’t this the tree you were 
taking us to? ... By Hera, a fine stopping place! This plane-tree is very spreading 
and tall, and the tallness and shadiness of the agnus are quite lovely; and being 
in full flower it seems to make the place smell as sweetly as it could. The stream, 
too, flows very attractively under the plane, with the coolest water, to judge by 
my foot. From the figurines and statuettes, the spot seems to be sacred to some 
Nymphs and to Achelous. Then again, if you like, how welcome it is, the 
freshness of the place, and very pleasant; it echoes with a summery shrillness to 
the cicadas’ song. Most delightful of all is the matter of the grass, growing on a 
gentle slope and thick enough to be just right to rest one’s head upon. (tr. Rowe) 
In this way Socrates makes clear that he was perfectly alert to the literary topos to 
which Phaedrus was alluding—namely the description of an idyllic meadow that 
functions as the prelude to seduction.11 Here at 230 Socrates deliberately 
intensifies each of the features highlighted by Phaedrus at 229. For as he 
expresses his own approval and delight the landscape and its sensuous effects 
become more vivid. The water (Ød£tion) now flows (·e‹) as ‘a most delightful 
stream’ (phg¾ cariest£th)12 and while merely implicitly cool earlier is now 
described explicitly as ‘very cold’ (m£la yucroà). The bare feet reappear as 
Socrates refers to his own foot as giving proof of this now very cold temperature. 
                                                 
9 For c£rij vocabulary as a signature of lyric, see e.g. Anacreon 402a-c (car…en; car…enta... 
car…enta) or 394 (car…essa); and Sappho 2.2 (c£rien). The familiar presence of the Graces 
(C£ritej) is a further distinctive element of the genre, see e.g. Stesichorus 212; Alcaeus 386; 
Sappho 44b, 53, 81, 103, and 128; Theognis 15-18; Ibycus 282c fr.1, 288; and Anacreon 346 fr. 3. 
10 That Oreithuia was ‘playing’ prior to the abduction is stressed again at 229c8 (pa…zousan). In 
the conclusion to the work Plato draws attention again to the setting (278b) and again highlights 
the element of play (278b7): ‘So now we have had due amusement (pepa…sqw metr…wj) from the 
subject of speaking’ (tr. Rowe). 
11 Foley (1998), 46 makes the point that since Hera is the goddess of marriage, Socrates’ oath picks 
up the theme of seduction and sexual initiation. 
12 At 242a1 the stream is ‘this river’ (tÕn potamÕn toàton). 
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Socrates identifies the high summer chorus of the cicadas, and the tree, both ‘very 
spreading (m£l' ¢mfilaf»j) and tall’, is joined by an agnus, equally tall and 
shady; indeed, the shade is now described as ‘quite lovely’ (tÕ sÚskion 
p£gkalon). The moderate breeze has become the ‘fresh breeze’ (tÕ eÜpnoun) of 
the place, which is both ‘welcome’ and ‘very pleasant’ (¢gaphtÕn kaˆ sfÒdra 
¹dÚ), and Socrates’ positive judgement on the landscape, ‘exceedingly pleasant’ 
(sfÒdra ¹dÚ), replaces Phaedrus’ litotes ‘not unpleasant’ (oÙk ¢hdšj). At 230 the 
sensuous charms of the place culminate in the grass which slopes and is thick 
enough to provide a comfortable head-rest. Here the laying down of the head 
(kataklinšnti) completes the physical delights for the whole body, from feet 
upwards. Further, resting the head involves lying down rather than sitting, a 
suggestion borne out by Socrates’ further proclamation at 230e3 that he does 
indeed intend to ‘lie down’ (katake…sesqai). Finally, the Ilissus meadow turns 
out to have figurines and statuettes, indicating that it is in fact sacred (ƒerÒn)—to 
‘some Nymphs’ and Achelous, the river-god.13 This intensification is part of the 
elevating motif used throughout the first part of the dialogue, whereby as the 
conversation proceeds Socrates’ discourse becomes more and more animated, if 
not actually inspired.14 But within the immediate drama Socrates signals to 
Phaedrus that he is equally aware of the erotic and seductive potential of their 
surroundings. Whereas in a lyric meadow the seduction is overtly sexual, here the 
‘game’ with similar attendant force and persuasion is engagement in conversation. 
The repetition of the verb pa…zein at 234d indicates that Socrates and Phaedrus 
have now assumed the roles of participants within the prelude meadow by playing 
their own conversational ‘games’. A further hint at the characters’ awareness of 
the erotic implications of their pastoral surroundings is given by Phaedrus at 
236c8-d1 where he notes that they are alone ‘in a deserted place’ and that he is 
stronger and younger than Socrates. Foley is right to read this passage as a playful 
link with the story of Oreithuia’s abduction.15 Through this teasing play Socrates 
and Phaedrus pose as participants within an erotic meadow. Calame spells out the 
connection between their role-play and the dialectic (1999, 186-7): 
It should be remembered that... the role that the philosopher adopts towards his 
interlocutor... is that of an erastês seeking to seduce his erômenos.16
To support Calame’s identification of the Ilissus as a prelude meadow, I would 
like to review the distinguishing features of the motif as used within lyric poetry 
and compare the Phaedrus scene with a wider range of lyric material. Calame 
notes (1999, 165-9) prelude meadows at Anacreon 346 and Ibycus 286 and their 
close affinity with Sappho’s grove of Aphrodite in poem 2. He summarises 
Sappho’s erotic scene (167):  
                                                 
13 See Rowe (1986), 142, citing de Vries. 
14 235c5; 237a7; 238c5-8; 238d1-3; 241e1-5; 244a2-3; 257a3-6; 263d2. 
15 Foley (1998), 45-6: ‘Nevertheless, the playful link with the Oreithuia myth lingers, as Socrates 
is more or less abducted by Phaedrus into these environs, seduced into a speech against his will 
(see 236d), and finally inspired with erotic madness.’  
16 On this view of role-play and philosophical seduction in the text, see duBois (1985), 95-6 and 
Nussbaum (1986), esp. 211-2. 
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This was a sacred precinct that comprised an orchard (alsos) of apple trees 
watered by a cool stream, altars that emitted the fragrant fumes of incense, and 
shady rose bushes beneath which one could slip into a deathly slumber. It was 
lapped by the gentlest of breezes and also included a meadow (leimôn), where 
horses grazed and flowers bloomed in the springtime.17  
In Anacreon 346 fr. 1 there are fields of hyacinth and horses freed from the yoke 
and in Ibycus 286.1-6 there are streams, apple trees, shade provided by vines, and 
the season is springtime. To these can be added further erotic meadows in lyric. 
Alcaeus 115a presents a spring-time scene with water, flowers, plants and grazing 
animals, and at 296b.1-8 the ‘lovely olive trees’ serve as the backdrop for the 
erotic encounters of boys ‘garlanded with hyacinth’, where again the season is 
spring. In Theognis 1249-52 the boy is likened to a horse, which now desires ‘a 
fair meadow, a cool stream, and a shady grove’, and similarly in Anacreon 417 the 
Thracian filly ‘plays’ (pa…zeij) in the ‘meadows’.18 The connection between the 
lush landscapes and the presence of divinity is notable. The grove in Sappho 2 is 
designed to tempt Aphrodite and is described as ‘a holy temple’. At Theognis 
1275-8 the spring landscape is the setting for the arrival of the god of Love. At 
Ibycus 282c fr. 1 Charis nurtured a boy ‘among lovely buds of roses... about the 
temple (of Aphrodite)’ (ð C£-/rij, ·Òdwn œ]qreyaj aÙtÕn k£luxin / 
'Afrod…taj] ¢mfˆ naÒn) and the same motif is used at 288 where a boy is loved 
and nursed by love goddesses amongst blossoms. Such a graceful setting is again 
associated with divinity at Ibycus 286.3-4, where ‘the Maidens’, who are likely to 
be divine Nymphs or Graces, have their ‘inviolate garden’ in the spring meadow 
of quince trees, shady vines and streams (†na Parqšnwn / kÁpoj ¢k»ratoj). In 
Anacreon 346 fr. 1 the goddess Aphrodite herself appears in ‘fields of hyacinth’ 
where a beautiful boy arrives for what is evidently erotic play.  
In comparing the seduction meadows of lyric with Plato’s Ilissus scene, seven 
main points of correspondence emerge: 1) stream; 2) plants and flowers; 3) shade; 
4) breeze: 5) erotic play; 6) presence of divinity; and 7) sleep. Indeed, Plato’s 
allusion to lyric poetry lies in the cumulative effect of these interlinking motifs 
rather than in any single feature.  
First there is the stream: Plato’s cold water (·e‹ m£la yucroà Ûdatoj), 
which flows directly under the plane, recalls Alcaeus’ yàcron Üdwr (115a); 
Sappho’s cold water running through the apple branches (2.5 Üdwr yàcron); 
Theognis’ kr»nhn te yucr»n (1252) and Ibycus’ streams that water the quince 
trees (286.2-3 ¢rdÒmenai ·o©n / ™k potamîn). Second there are the plants and 
flowers, in this case primarily the trees—the plane and the agnus with its scented 
flowers—but also the grass. The lush growth and scents of Plato’s text (e.g. æj 
¢km¾n œcei tÁj ¥nqhj æj ¨n eÙwdšstaton paršcoi tÕn tÒpon) recall the 
plants and blossoms of various lyrics: Alcaeus 115a (lex£nqidoj... eÙwdes[) and 
296b (™l£aij ™rošssa[ij]); Sappho 2 (tšqalen ºr…noisin ¥nqesin); Ibycus 286 
(a† t' o„nanq…dej aÙxÒmenai); and Anacreon 346 fr. 1 (t¦j Øakin[q…naj 
                                                 
17 Calame then notes (1999, 168) the parallel with the flower-filled meadows of Sappho 96.11 
(poluanqšmoij ¢roÚraij). A further parallel is Sappho 122 where a ‘tender girl’ is ‘picking 
flowers’ (¥nqe' ¢mšrgoisan pa‹d'... ¢p£lan). 
18 Slings (1978). 
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¢r]oÚraj). Third, Plato notes the shade provided by the height and spreading 
growth of the trees (229 sk…a; 230 tÕ sÚskion), which recalls the ample shade of 
Sappho’s roses (2.7 ™sk…ast'), Theognis’ ‘shady grove’ (1252 ¥lse£ te skier£) 
and Ibycus’ ‘shady vine branches’ (286.5 skiero‹sin Ûf' ›rnesin). Fourth, there 
is the breeze: the gentle winds of Sappho 2 (¥htai mšllica pnšoisin), become 
for Plato the ‘the freshness of the breeze’, with pnšoisin echoed in tÕ eÜpnoun 
(230c1). Fifth is the erotic play evident in lyric in lines such as Theognis 1249 
(skirtîn), Anacreon 357 (sumpa…zousin), 358 (sumpa…zein) and 417 (skirtîsa 
pa…zeij), and knowingly signalled by Phaedrus at 229b8 (pa…zein). 
The sixth feature of Plato’s meadow that aligns it closely with lyric meadows 
is the sacredness of the place and the presence of divinity. First at 229c when 
Socrates answers Phaedrus’ question about the location of Oreithuia’s abduction, 
he mentions an ‘altar of Boreas’ nearby (229c2 bwmÕj... Boršou). Then at 230b-c 
Plato establishes the divine quality of their actual resting place. He echoes 
Sappho’s adjective ¥gnon (2.1-2 ™p[ˆ tÒnd]e naàon / ¥gnon)19 with the noun 
¥gnou—the plane tree (230b3). The two words are closely connected, since the 
name of the tree referred to, the Vitex Agnus-castus, is derived from the adjective 
¥gnoj, as LSJ note with their translation ‘chaste tree’. The connection is then 
strengthened when Plato points out that his spot too ‘seems to be sacred’ (ƒerÒn), 
as indicated by the presence of holy statues, here of the Nymphs and Achelous, 
the river god. The divinity of the place is further stressed at 236d10-e1, as the 
plane tree itself is identified as a ‘god’ (t…na qeîn; À boÚlei t¾n pl£tanon 
tauthn…), and at 238c9-d1 where the whole place is regarded as ‘divine’ (qe‹oj... Ð 
tÒpoj). In the dialogue’s conclusion at 278b9 the Ilissus meadow is further 
referenced as ‘the spring of the Nymphs and the sacred place of the Muses’ (tÕ 
Numfîn n©m£ te kaˆ mouse‹on). 20
Finally, on sleep: in Sappho 2 an erotic kîma, or ‘deathly slumber’, is said to 
‘flow down from the shimmering leaves’ (a„qussomšnwn d fÚllwn / kîma 
katšrrei). Calame explains this erotic koma as he observes that in Greek literary 
culture Aphrodite’s divine power ‘can create a fusion of sexual fulfilment, sleep 
and death’ (1999, 6).21 While such a sleep does not feature directly at Phaedrus 
230, its influence is still felt in the scene. At 230c there is a suggestion of sleep as 
Socrates notes how the gentle slope with lush grass is just right for ‘resting one’s 
head’, at 230e he declares that he will ‘lie down’ (katake…sesqai), and later, as 
he again draws attention to their retreat beneath the tree, Socrates speaks directly 
of the usual activity of those at leisure in the noonday sun, i.e. ‘nodding off’ 
(nust£zontaj... eÛdein 259a3-6; kaqeudhtšon 259d8). In this passage the sleep is 
also attributed to a magical effect—that of the singing of the cicadas above, where 
the verb used is ‘charmed’ (khloumšnouj 259a3).22
                                                 
19 On ‘Holy Sappho’, as love’s priestess, see Gentili (1988), 216-22. 
20 Plato’s Nymphs as the goddesses of the place are thus the counterpart to the Graces and love 
divinities that fill with their presence the lyric seduction meadows.  
21 See also Calame (1999, 36-8) and 167, where he discusses ‘the slumber and death that the 
Greeks equated with the state of erotic love’. 
22 For other references to the midday heat, see 242a (tÕ kaàma, meshmbr…a, ¢poyucÍ) and 
279b4-5 (tÕ pn‹goj ºpièteron gšgonen). 
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In these comparisons between the meadow of the Ilissus and those of lyric 
poetry two differences stand out, both of which can be explained in the light of 
Plato’s composition. First, in contrast to the dominant motif of spring in the poetic 
meadows,23 Plato chooses summer for his own scene, as is clear at 230c with the 
adjective qerinÒn: the meadow even sounds attractive because it echoes to the 
‘summery’ and ‘clear’ song of the cicadas. The association between summer and 
the cicadas’ song is already established in the lyric tradition, as can be seen in 
Alcaeus’ verses (347a and b):  
the cicada sings sweetly from the leaves... and it pours incessantly its clear song 
from under its wings, when flaming summer... (tr. Campbell)  
One ready answer to account for Plato’s change of season is that the summer 
setting is needed to prepare the way for the important myth of the cicadas at 258e-
259d. The second difference in Plato is the absence of horses. The lyric poets 
often place horses, or other grazing animals, within the eroticised meadow. 
Alcaeus’ fragmentary poem 115a mentions a ‘horse’ („pp[...) and portrays a scene 
‘grazed by goats’ (a„gibÒ[t), and Sappho’s meadow in 2.9 is ‘grazed by a horse’ 
(le…mwn „ppÒbotoj). In his equestrian imagery Theognis also locates the horses 
within the erotic meadows (e.g. 1249-52: †ppJ... leimîn£ te kalÒn). At 346 fr. 
1.9 Anacreon speaks of Aphrodite ‘tethering her horses’ in the meadow and at 
417.5 the ‘Thracian filly’ is addressed as ‘grazing’ and ‘playing’ in the meadows 
(nàn d leimîn£j te bÒskeai koàf£ te skirtîsa pa…zeij). The reason why 
there are no horses in Plato’s prologue again relates to the composition of the 
dialogue as a whole: by omitting the grazing horses the motif is reserved, for 
maximum impact, until the stunning simile of the horses and charioteer of soul at 
246a. The connection between the horses of Plato’s myth and the meadows of 
lyric will be discussed below (§5.1).  
Plato appropriates the lyric motif of the prelude meadow to set the scene for a 
conversation on love between characters who are evidently aware of the literary 
topos and ready to tease each other with its implications for their own relationship 
as participants within dialectic. The importance of the literary background to this 
conversation is again highlighted when Socrates responds to the speech of Lysias 
by claiming that he has heard better from other writers. It is at this point that 
Sappho and Anacreon are named. 
3. The naming  
After Phaedrus performs Lysias’ speech, he invites Socrates to join him in 
commending it (234c). When Socrates demurs, Phaedrus asserts that no other 
speaker could match Lysias’ achievement (235b). Socrates then explains why he 
cannot agree with this assessment (235b7-d3): 
SW. palaioˆ g¦r kaˆ sofoˆ ¥ndrej te kaˆ guna‹kej perˆ aÙtîn e„rhkÒtej 
kaˆ gegrafÒtej ™xelšgxous… me, ™£n soi carizÒmenoj sugcwrî.  
FAI. t…nej oátoi; kaˆ poà sÝ belt…w toÚtwn ¢k»koaj;  
                                                 
23 Alcaeus 115a ½rinon and 296b.3 œaroj pÚl[ai; Sappho 2.10 ºr…noisin ¥nqesin; Theognis 1276 
¥nqesin e„arino‹j q£llei ¢exomšnh; and Ibycus 286.1-2 Ãri mn a† te Kudèniai / mhl…dej. 
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SW. nàn mn oÛtwj oÙk œcw e„pe‹n: dÁlon d Óti tinîn ¢k»koa, ½ pou 
Sapfoàj tÁj kalÁj À 'Anakršontoj toà sofoà À kaˆ suggrafšwn tinîn. 
pÒqen d¾ tekmairÒmenoj lšgw; plÁršj pwj, ð daimÒnie, tÕ stÁqoj œcwn 
a„sq£nomai par¦ taàta ¨n œcein e„pe‹n ›tera m¾ ce…rw. Óti mn oân 
par£ ge ™mautoà oÙdn aÙtîn ™nnenÒhka, eâ oda, suneidëj ™mautù 
¢maq…an: le…petai d¾ omai ™x ¢llotr…wn poqn nam£twn di¦ tÁj ¢koÁj 
peplhrîsqa… me d…khn ¢gge…ou. ØpÕ d nwqe…aj aâ kaˆ aÙtÕ toàto 
™pilšlhsmai, Ópwj te kaˆ ïntinwn ½kousa.  
Soc: For ancient and wise men and women who have spoken and written about 
these subjects will refute me, if I agree simply to please you. 
Phdr: Who are these people? Where have you heard anything better than this? 
Soc: Right now, I can’t tell you straight off. But I’m sure I’ve heard something 
better from someone—perhaps from the fine Sappho or the wise Anacreon or 
indeed from some prose writers. What am I basing my judgement on as I say 
this? Well, my fine friend, it is because my breast is somehow full that I feel that 
I might have other words, no worse, to say beyond these of Lysias. And that I’ve 
developed none of these from my own ideas I know very well, since I am fully 
aware of my own ignorance. So what remains, I think, is that I have been filled 
up, just like a vessel, from streams from elsewhere, through my ears. But again 
because of my stupidity I have forgotten this very point: how and from whom I 
heard it.24
Thus Socrates is sure that he has heard ‘something better’ and indicates at the start 
of his response that he is aware of the reaction of ‘ancient and wise men and 
women’ who have discussed this subject of love. But when pressed as to who 
these people are, his answer is vague—he has heard something better ‘from 
someone’ (tinîn). He then ventures the two names but prefaced by ‘perhaps’ 
(pou) and set against the alternative: ‘or indeed some prose writers.’ The effect is 
that of a person trying to remember something they can only vaguely recall and 
offering possible identifications. Finally his statement ends with the point that he 
has simply forgotten his source.  
Thus Sappho and Anacreon are referenced apparently casually as Socrates is 
rather airy about which earlier speakers and writers might have influenced him. In 
the midst of such vagueness the terms of approbation (Sapfoàj tÁj kalÁj À 
'Anakršontoj toà sofoà) seem formulaic and insincere: maybe it was Sappho, 
maybe Anacreon, maybe even one of the prose-writers. On this reading one 
question that arises is why Sappho and Anacreon are singled out at all and why 
Socrates does not, to balance his mention of prose-writers, simply refer to poets at 
large. Ferrari suggests that Sappho and Anacreon are to be seen as ‘emblems’ of 
love-poetry (1987, 106), a suggestion supported by a point made by Foley (1998, 
42): ‘Sappho and Anacreon were consistently paired in antiquity as the originators 
and quintessential practitioners of the tradition of erotic poetry.’ While Foley does 
not offer any actual evidence, various testimonies collected by Campbell in his 
volumes of Greek Lyric do support the claim, with Sappho and Anacreon paired or 
                                                 
24 This translation of this passage is based on that of Rowe (1986) but is made more literal, at the 
expense of fluency, in an attempt to secure the most neutral reading possible.  
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linked a number of times.25 Nevertheless, Sappho is also paired with Alcaeus26 
and with Alcman.27 If one accepts that the pairing of Sappho and Anacreon was 
standard in Plato’s time, then the naming of these two could be read simply as 
emblematic of lyric poetry as it is balanced against prose-writing. This reading 
would suggest, then, that the terms of praise are formulaic and not particularly 
significant or sincere. But Socrates’ reference to the poets has also to be judged 
against his next comment where a clear note of irony is sounded.  
As Socrates presents himself as someone influenced by earlier speakers and 
writers, he speaks of receiving into himself ‘streams from elsewhere’. The flowing 
streams of the Muses are an established image for poetic inspiration, which Plato 
himself probes in other discussions on poetry.28 Such a pointed poetic image, full 
of irony from a character readily identifiable as determinedly prosaic, punctures 
the sense that the reference to the poets is casual. Instead the passage now seems 
like a challenge, offering a suggestion that the speaker himself finds patently 
ludicrous—that he has been somehow inspired by the poets. Forgetting the 
identity of the source would be consistent with the poet’s stance of being 
distracted at the time of being inspired. Thus the passage might even suggest, 
alongside stock Socratic ignorance, mockery of the poetic tradition. If so, the 
terms of praise would become not merely formulaic but more of a jibe. Hackforth 
(1952, 36) maintains that the suggestion of inspiration from the poets is indeed 
‘not to be taken seriously’, and the view is given fuller development by Rowe 
who probes further into the particular dramatic context. 
For Rowe, this praise cannot be sincere, since ‘Plato’s Socrates normally 
displays a thoroughgoing hostility towards poets of all descriptions’ (1986, 151). 
He argues rather that Socrates’ mention of Sappho and Anacreon is consistent with 
‘Plato’s general attitude towards poets’ (151), since Socrates’ actual point is that 
the irrational desire graphically presented by the poets provides far stronger 
arguments against love even than those of Lysias. He therefore concludes: ‘The 
tone of the expressions “the excellent... Sappho” and the “the wise... Anacreon” is 
thoroughly ironical.’ Rowe’s reading of the passage as Socratic irony provides one 
explanation of why the lyric poets are mentioned: they depict the madness of the 
lover so graphically that any sane person would wish to avoid this state.29 The 
idea that the poets present an unenlightened account of love is consistent with the 
ranking of the poet as sixth in the hierarchy of lives (Phaedrus 248d-e). This 
unflattering view of the poet cannot be explained away: he is ranked beneath the 
                                                 
25 For example, in testimonies from Athenaeus (vol. I, 11, 37; II, 127), Seneca (I, 23), Dionysius of 
Helicarnassus (I, 39), Menander Rhetor (I, 41), Themistius (I, 45), Aulus Gellius (I, 45), Plutarch 
(I, 47), Gregory of Corinth (I, 165; II, 133), Pausanias (II, 31), and Caesius Bassus (II, 139). 
26 Eusebius (vol. I, 9), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I, 35), Strabo (I, 37) and Porphyry (I, 179). 
27 Menander Rhetor (vol. I, 41). 
28 Cf. Plato’s Ion 534a with the ‘rivers’ (tîn potamîn) where the poet gathers his melodies; and 
Laws 719c where the poet inspired by the Muses is like a fountain (oŒon d kr»nh tij) gushing 
forth. In Phaedrus see also 238c7 for the pun on inspiration and running water in eÜroia (lit. 
‘good flow’). 
29 The argument of this section has benefited from critical discussion at the Classics Research 
Seminar, University of Durham (May 2007). I am grateful for the challenges and suggestions from 
colleagues, in particular Christopher Rowe. 
10 
E.E. PENDER, SAPPHO AND ANACREON IN PLATO’S Phaedrus 
physical trainer and doctor, beneath even the seer, and a mere three steps away 
from the tyrant. As someone concerned with ‘imitation’ (m…mhsij) rather than 
reality, the poet cannot claim knowledge. And if poets do not have knowledge, 
then how is the praise of two of them as ‘fine’ and indeed ‘wise’ to be understood? 
Reading the praise as ironic seems a valid response, especially since the same 
strategy of praising before undercutting is also used elsewhere with poets, for 
example when Simonides in Republic is hailed as sophos before his view on 
justice is comprehensively discredited (Rep. 331e6 sofÕj kaˆ qe‹oj).30 I will not 
try to downplay the evidence of 248d-e. The passage is important and stands as 
one firm position consistent with views elsewhere in the corpus on the status of 
the poets’ wisdom. The difficulty, however, is that of taking this as the dominant 
view of Phaedrus when the use of poetic discourse around it is so pronounced. 
Put simply: if the poets are completely ignorant about reality, then why does the 
text spend so much time recreating poetic discourse on love? Annas (1982, 12) 
has identified within Plato ‘a split attitude’ to poetry and sees this conflict between 
positions as ‘lasting’ and ‘not easily resolved’. There are no easy answers and I 
acknowledge that the later ranking of the poet’s life does challenge the reading of 
the praise at 235c as straightforwardly sincere. But the evidence of the text itself 
seems to force a situation where this cannot be the final word on the matter. 
Nightingale is but one of a number of critics who have noted that the narrative 
of Socrates’ second speech is ‘replete with the discourse of lyric love poetry’ 
(1995, 158). That lyric poetry is present in the text is not in itself a contentious 
point, even though surprisingly few studies are concerned with the details of the 
allusions themselves: what is at stake rather is how to interpret that presence. In 
1950 Robin argued that the praise at 235c is sincere since Socrates is referring to 
the love poets as the source of ideas that will feature in his later second speech. 
Fortenbaugh (1966, 108) takes the view further: 
The proper names ‘Sappho’ and ‘Anacreon’ have a particular significance and 
are not a general reference to lyric love poets. These two names are introduced 
to alert the reader that the poems of Sappho and Anacreon will play a role in 
Socrates’ subsequent speeches. Indeed the primary and so far unnoticed purpose 
for naming these poets is to anticipate poetic reminiscences occurring in 
Socrates’ two speeches. 
De Vries agrees, noting (1969, 74-5) that although the positive terms kalos and 
sophos can convey irony, they are used here ‘in a pregnant sense’, foreshadowing 
the allusions to come. De Vries indeed holds that the authority of the poets is fully 
acknowledged and, moreover, that the naming of Sappho is ‘spontaneous homage 
to the poetess who knew love’ (75).31 Foley (1998, 40) similarly reads the praise 
of Sappho as ‘pointed’ in view of the poetess’ influence on Socrates’ later 
argument on love.32 Before we consider the relationship between the naming and 
                                                 
30 Halliwell (2000), 106-7 discusses this reference to Simonides as wise, and notes uses of the 
parallel praise ‘godlike’ for the poets in other dialogues. 
31 Demos (1999), 68 also regards Socrates’ comment as a sincere point about poetic tradition and 
authority. 
32 The views of Foley (1998) and duBois (1985), (1995) on Sappho’s presence in Phaedrus will be 
discussed below (§5.2, on memory and beauty). 
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the influence of these two poets on the text itself, let us observe how the passage 
at 235c may point to another level of meaning. 
The reference to ‘streams from elsewhere’ at 235c raises the issue of lyric 
inspiration directly before a pair of speeches which will themselves draw 
increasingly heavily on lyric discourse. By directing attention to the lyric voices 
that will follow in the text, the reference seems ironic and self-reflexive, pointing 
up Plato’s own authorship. The image itself seems to be humorous, since 
inspiration is evidently more than a matter of being mechanically and passively 
‘filled up’ with ideas.33 Following these hints, I read this passage as operating 
within one of the chief games34 of the Phaedrus: the attribution of speeches to 
various authors as part of an exploration of originality and influence. Waterfield 
notes that, while Phaedrus recites Lysias, Socrates not only cites Sappho and 
Anacreon but also identifies as the authors of his speeches Phaedrus, the Muses, 
the Nymphs and even Stesichorus.35 Through this multiple attribution Plato is 
ultimately prompting us to consider his own role as author and at 235c, as well as 
wryly hinting at his character’s reliance on him,36 seems also be making, through 
the subtext, a serious point about his own intellectual debts. Since the praise of 
Sappho and Anacreon is indeed supported by positive reminiscences of their 
poetry elsewhere in the dialogue, then surely this must force a reading of 235c 
that is non-ironic in relation to Plato himself? The point would seem to be that 
Plato by having Socrates mock the idea that he might have learnt anything useful 
from the poets is actually raising the possibility—in a playful manner37—that he, 
as author, has.  
This approach to the matter of how to read 235c requires the acceptance of a 
gap between author and character. While for some interpreters this is not a valid 
move, for others watching and tracing the moments of apparent self-reflexivity in 
the dialogues is a useful strategy of interpretation. In her powerful and 
illuminating account of Plato as author, Blondell analyses Plato’s various 
techniques for distancing himself from the views and voices of his characters.38 
She notes (2002, 37-48) both the formal absence of Plato from the text and his 
omnipresence as ‘author behind the scene’ (43), as ‘puppeteer’ (45) and 
                                                 
33 See duBois (1995), 85-6 on the image of the vessel at 235d: ‘This little joke both recapitulates 
Socrates’ critique of poetry in the Ion, that poets know nothing but are simply conduits of divine 
inspiration, and takes a gentle swipe at Phaedrus himself, who has only Lysias’ discourse, nothing 
of his own to say about love.’ Foley (1998), 44 expresses the same view: ‘here he may in part be 
mocking not only traditional representations of poetic inspiration but Phaedrus’ eagerness to 
absorb the words of others rather than think for himself.’ On the humorous aspects of the image, 
see Pender (2007), 73. 
34 On the playful elements, see Mackenzie (1982), 64-76. 
35 Waterfield (2002), 84 on 242d. 
36 Although Rowe’s reading is quite different from mine, he too notes a possible self-reflexive 
gesture at 235c in the idea that Socrates may have got his ideas from one of the prose-writers: 
‘Where else would ‘Socrates’ get his ideas from, if not from a prose-writer (i.e. Plato)? A 
deliberate wink at the reader?’ (1986, 151). 
37 The piquancy of the lines accords with Hinds’ view on allusive methods, since he regards 
allusions as involving ‘teasing play between revelation and concealment’ (1998, 23). 
38 Blondell (2002), ch.1-2, esp. 20 and 110-11. 
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‘superspeaker’ (43).39 This approach seems to me reasonable: other passages that 
seem to hint at Plato’s own authorial role include Cebes’ plaintive cry to Socrates 
at Phaedo 78a (where will they find another such charmer for their fears?) and 
Symposium 223d (could the same man write both tragedy and comedy?). Another 
critic who defends such an approach is Halliwell (2000, 101):  
The practices of citation and criticism that Plato’s text presents, and to some 
extent arguably endorses, cannot plausibly be taken as merely unreflective. In 
particular, the possibility of distinguishing between authorial voice and the 
voices of characters is one that Plato can hardly have overlooked, since it is the 
very basis of the analysis of mimetic modes put forward at Rep. 3.392c ff., and is 
acknowledged in other ways elsewhere, even, on occasion, in the act of citation.  
I believe that in his praise of the poets at 235c Plato is opening up a gap between 
Socrates as character and himself as author in order to highlight that the two 
figures have a very different situation in relation to the Greek poetic tradition. 
Blondell (2002, 110) observes on Plato that ‘it is the decision to write that 
distinguishes him most sharply not only from Sokrates, but from those Socratics 
who imitated him by writing nothing down’. Her point seems important: once 
Plato becomes a writer, his relationship to literary tradition does change markedly 
from that of the historical Socrates. And while I accept the fact that the Platonic 
Socrates (speaking within the pages of the text) does not converge with the 
historical Socrates, I do not think it is unreasonable that the text of the Phaedrus, 
which is so concerned with writing, should draw attention to the location of both 
character and author in relation to the Greek literary tradition.  
On this reading, the author, in a moment of Platonic irony, uses his principal 
character’s reactions to the poets as a means of highlighting his own position as 
inheritor of a poetic as well as philosophical tradition. And while Socrates has 
pointedly forgotten his source, Plato explicitly recalls two of those who have 
influenced him.40 Further, the unusual inclusiveness of the mention at the start of 
the passage of wise ‘men and women’ of antiquity (palaioˆ g¦r kaˆ sofoˆ 
¥ndrej te kaˆ guna‹kej) seems a careful preparation for the naming of Sappho 
alongside Anacreon.41 The text is stressing that females as well as males have 
contributed to ancient discourses on love. So if the praise is ironic, then the text is 
highlighting that Sappho is as unwise as the other male authors. The question then 
becomes whether this view of Sappho is consistent with evidence from the text of 
Phaedrus. Since my reading of the dialogue finds positive allusions to the poets 
and particularly to Sappho, my conclusion on 235c is that the praise of Sappho 
and Anacreon is both ironic, from Socrates, and non-ironic, from Plato. It is my 
                                                 
39 Blondell (2002), 43 notes that her adoption of the term ‘superspeaker’ is from Maranhão (1990). 
40 The apparently minor detail of Socrates’ memory failure is a further little joke from the author, 
since one of the particular debts that Plato is paying to Sappho will concern her thoughts on 
memory itself, as will be discussed in §5.2. On the usual strengths of Socrates’ recall of poetry, see 
Halliwell (2000), 96: ‘Across the oeuvre... it is often taken for granted that the parties to 
discussion... are sufficiently immersed in poetry... to be able either to quote or to recognize 
quotation. This is true, not least, of Socrates himself, who is shown as possessing a particularly 
well-endowed memory for poetic texts.’ 
41 Foley (1998), 54 comments: ‘the mention of women (see also Meno 81a) is initially striking in a 
Greek context.’ 
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thesis that Plato’s tribute to the lyric poets is due to their vivid presentations of the 
force of eros, presentations that he will utilise in his own exploration of the 
relationship between mania and self-control. In the main body of my paper I shall 
now trace how Plato develops, in the first three speeches of Phaedrus, his central 
theme of power and force.  
4. Power and force 
A shared and fundamental theme runs through the three speeches on love in 
Phaedrus: love’s power. In exploring this theme Plato draws on the language of 
love shaped by the Greek poetic tradition whereby love holds and exercises a 
dangerous power upon the lover. The lyric poets in particular offered distinctive 
portrayals of the overwhelming power of Eros, not only in the pain of unfulfilled 
desire but also in the erotic experience per se. Love is a threatening external force, 
whose onslaught leaves the lover weakened and disorientated. Within this lyric 
conception of desire there is a further established view of love as madness—
which becomes a dominant motif in Socrates’ second speech. In Lysias’ speech 
familiar prose terminology presents the lover as unable to exercise proper 
judgement and so act in his own best interest. But even here there is language that 
points to eros as an independent force. The vocabulary for the power of love then 
becomes more abstract in Socrates’ first speech with the passage on inner rulers 
and control (237d-238c) and finally more poetic and highly-coloured in Socrates’ 
second speech.42
Let us begin by reviewing lyric language for love’s power. In poem 1 Sappho 
entreats the goddess of love not to ‘overpower’ her heart (3-4 m» m'... d£mna, / 
pÒtnia, qàmon) and uses the same verb (damn£w) for Aphrodite’s power at 102 
(pÒqJ d£meisa). Theognis at 1388-9 speaks of Aphrodite as ‘overpowering’ the 
minds of men (damn´j ¢nqrèpwn pukin¦j fršnaj) and adds that no one is 
strong or wise enough to ‘escape’ (fuge‹n) her. Anacreon similarly hails Eros as 
the ‘subduer’ (357 dam£lhj ”Erwj) and again speaks of the lover seeking an 
escape (346 fr. 4.3-6 ™kfugën ”Erwta; 400 ”Erwta feÚgwn). At 505d Anacreon 
hails Eros’ power over gods and men (Óde kaˆ qeîn dunast»j, / Óde kaˆ 
brotoÝj dam£zei). Often the poets image love as a hostile, attacking force that 
invades and through its physical impact destroys the lover. Alcaeus presents 
himself as felled by Aphrodite’s hand (380 œpeton Kuprogen»aj pal£maisin); 
while Ibycus 287.1-5 likens the rush of love to a martial attack, where the lover 
exclaims: Ã m¦n tromšw nin ™percÒmenon (‘How I tremble at his onset!’). 
Anacreon uses a Homeric battle term, kudoimo… (literally, ‘the roar of battle’),43 to 
describe the turmoil that Love causes (398 ¢strag£lai d' ”ErwtÒj e„sin / 
man…ai te kaˆ kudoimo…). Sappho 47 likens Eros to a violent wind that falls upon 
trees (”Eroj d' ™t…naxš moi / fršnaj, çj ¥nemoj k¦t Ôroj drÚsin ™mpštwn). 
Ibycus develops this image in 286.6-13, where the love that comes from 
Aphrodite is likened to the ‘Thracian Boreas’, so powerful is its effect through all 
                                                 
42 The progression from more neutral to highly lyrical language is similar to that between 229c and 
230a in their respective observations on the river and plane tree. 
43 See e.g. Iliad 10.523. 
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the heart (™gkratšwj pedÒqen... fršnaj). Sappho speaks of love ‘shaking’ her 
heart (130 ”Eroj dhâtš m' Ñ lusimšlhj dÒnei), and Anacreon depicts love as a 
smith’s mighty hammer blow (413 meg£lJ dhâtš m' ”Erwj œkoyen éste 
calkeÝj pelškei). The madness caused by love is a familiar theme in lyric. 
Alcaeus tells of Helen’s madness in her love for Paris (283.5 ™km£neisa) and 
refers to the ‘maddened infatuations’ of eros at 10b.6-7 (m]ainÒmenon 
[...]¢u£tais'). Sappho 1.18 speaks more intimately of her own ‘maddened heart’ 
(mainÒlv qÚmJ). Theognis associates Eros with madness as he portrays him as 
‘nursed by frenzies’ (1231-2 man…ai s' ™tiqhn»santo laboàsai). For Ibycus 
Aphrodite sends a storm-wind that blazes with lightning and ‘parching fits of 
madness’ (286.10-11 ¢zalšaij man…-/aisin); while Anacreon 359 gives succinct 
expression to the lover’s plight:  
KleoboÚlou mn œgwg' ™ršw,  
KleoboÚlJ d' ™pima…nomai,  
   KleÒboulon d dioskšw.  
I love Cleobulus, I am mad about Cleobulus, I gaze at Cleobulus. (tr. Campbell) 
Let us now consider how this established lyric language forms the background 
to the terminology for love used by Lysias and Socrates. Lysias’ speech considers 
the behaviour of lovers and for the most part speaks directly of the participants, 
the lovers and beloveds, rather than love itself. The problem that concerns Lysias 
is that lovers lose their self-control. Lysias establishes the familiar idea that the 
lack of self-control in love is allied with the failure to think properly (231d3-4 
kakîj fronoàsin / eâ fron»santej) and pays particular attention to the change 
occasioned when the lover’s desire ceases and he returns to his usual ways of 
thinking and behaving (232e6 ™peid¦n tÁj ™piqum…aj paÚswntai; 234a7 
pauÒmenoi tÁj ™piqum…aj). The difference between lovers and non-lovers is that 
while the first act ‘under compulsion’ (Øp' ¢n£gkhj), the second act out of ‘their 
own choosing’ (˜kÒntej), in line with their self-interest (231a4-5). This 
representation of the lovers’ plight is summed up at 231d2-3:  
kaˆ g¦r aÙtoˆ Ðmologoàsi nose‹n m©llon À swfrone‹n, kaˆ e„dšnai Óti 
kakîj fronoàsin, ¢ll' oÙ dÚnasqai aØtîn krate‹n.  
Lovers agree that they are ‘sick’ and not ‘sound of mind’. They accept that their 
thinking is impaired and that they are no longer ‘masters of themselves’. Note 
how the phraseology is shifting subtly: if a lover is not master of himself then who 
or what is his master? Plato is probing the standard prose vocabulary of self-
control in order to lead on to the conception of love as an independent force. And 
the move is completed at 233b-c. First the noun eros is used in the nominative as 
the subject of three verbs (233b2-4): ™pide…knutai, poie‹ and, most significantly, 
¢nagk£zei. Love here compels the lover to make inappropriate judgements. 
Second, the power of the self is contrasted explicitly with the power of love at 
233c1-2, as the non-lover proudly declares his advantage: oÙc Øp' œrwtoj 
¹ttèmenoj ¢ll' ™mautoà kratîn (‘I am not overcome by love, but master of 
myself’). The prose verb ¹ttèmenoj (‘be defeated, beaten, overcome’) can be read 
as a neutral term and the expression seems standard in the context. But the phrase 
also recalls the martial attack of eros in poetry and looks forward to the 
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conception of love as an independent force, a conception that will be held up for 
much closer scrutiny by Socrates. 
In his first speech Socrates follows Lysias’ concern with the lover’s poor 
judgement and decision-making. He employs much of the same standard prose 
terminology for the experience of being in love. But he begins to press this 
terminology, nudging familiar formulations towards a more analytical and abstract 
perspective in order to consider the nature of the process whereby a person is 
‘overcome’ by eros. Socrates begins his first speech with an invocation to the 
Muses which, although ironic, nevertheless gives notice of the direction that his 
performances will take (237a7): ¥gete d», ð Moàsai, e‡te di' òdÁj edoj 
l…geiai. The invocation imitates the familiar poetic formulations and the closest 
parallel in extant lyric seems to be Stesichorus 240: deàr' ¥ge, KalliÒpeia 
l…geia. This brief allusion thus anticipates the mention of Stesichorus in the 
interlude at 243a, and of Calliope, who as the eldest of her sisters is given 
prominence in the myth of the cicadas as the Muse of philosophy (259d). The 
formal introduction to this speech also slyly heralds the continuing theme of force 
when Socrates insists that his story will be one that Phaedrus ‘compels’ him to tell 
(237a9 ¢nagk£zei).  
Socrates addresses his subject in characteristic style—by seeking a definition 
of love itself (237c-d). There is thus a clear shift of attention from the lovers’ 
behaviour to the force that drives them. The relevant aspect of the definiendum is 
stated within the very question that leads the search: ‘let us establish an agreed 
definition of love, about what sort of thing it is and what power it possesses’ 
(237c8-d1 oŒÒn t' œsti kaˆ ¿n œcei dÚnamin). The chosen angle of love’s 
dunamis soon leads to the idea of inner rulers and forces (237d6-9):  
We must next observe that in each of us there are two kinds of thing which rule 
and lead us (dÚo tinš ™ston „dša ¥rconte kaˆ ¥gonte) which we follow 
wherever they may lead (oŒn ˜pÒmeqa Î ¨n ¥ghton), the one an inborn desire 
for pleasures, another an acquired judgement which aims at the best. (tr. Rowe) 
The passage then offers in very quick succession an array of different terms for 
love’s exercise of power and control (237d-238c). The analysis culminates in the 
definition of eros as an irrational impulse that has ‘gained control’ (krat»sasa) 
over ‘right judgement’ and takes its name from its ‘force’ (rhome), a playful 
etymology backed up by the wordplay of ™rrwmšnwj ·wsqe‹sa... ·èmhj... œrwj 
(238c2-4). The Greek vocabulary of inner powers and forces in this passage 
includes ‘ruling’ and ‘holding sway’ (¥rconte; ¢rx£shj; tÍ ¢rcÍ; krate‹; 
kratoÚshj; tù kr£tei; kratoàsa; krat»sasa; turanneÚsasa; 
dunasteuoÚshj);44 ‘conquering’ (nik»sasa); ‘having physical strength’ 
(™rrwmšnwj ·wsqe‹sa; ·èmhj) and the exertion of physical force in ‘dragging’ 
(˜lkoÚshj) and ‘pushing on’ (Ðrmèshj). The political language for eros here 
recalls Sappho’s pÒtnia and Anacreon’s dun£sthj and is reinforced towards the 
end of the dialogue at 265c2 where Socrates speaks directly of Eros as despÒthj. 
                                                 
44 At 238e the ruling metaphor is joined by that of slavery (¢rcomšnJ douleÚont… te) and 241a it 
appears alongside another military/political term for ‘chief, ruler, leader’, prost£thj (¥llon 
¥rconta ™n aØtù kaˆ prost£thn... tÁj protšraj ¢no»tou ¢rcÁj). 
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The idea of eros as a conquering force also recalls various lyrics where love is 
imaged as attacking and defeating the lover, while the physical strength of eros 
that can here ‘drag’ or ‘push’ objects echoes the lyric conception of love as an 
external force that can physically impact on objects.  
After delivering this more abstract analysis of love Socrates notes that 
something ‘divine’ (238c6 qe‹on) seems to have happened to him and speaks of 
the possibility that he may become ‘possessed by nymphs’ as his speech proceeds 
(238d1 numfÒlhptoj... gšnwmai).45 With a nod back to his invocation of the 
Muses, Socrates seems to wonder where all this high-flown talk will lead. But 
what actually happens is that he returns to a prosaic mode of discourse more 
closely matched to that of Lysias, with attention focused mainly on the outward 
behaviour of the lovers. Nevertheless, the analysis of love’s dunamis at 237d-238c 
is not lost, since the speech now maintains a dual perspective, noting both the 
lover’s actions and his inner condition. The most significant reference to the 
earlier analysis of love’s dunamis comes at 241a. 
When Socrates resumes his speech at 238d8, he speaks of the lover as ‘ruled 
by desire’ (238e3 tù d¾ ØpÕ ™piqum…aj ¢rcomšnJ) and tells how in his 
selfishness the lover seeks to make his beloved weaker and inferior to him. So the 
lover’s ‘inner ruler’ leads him to try to exert his own rule over the beloved in their 
relationship. As the speech proceeds, the lover is then spoken of as ‘compelled to 
seek pleasure instead of good’, where the verb is ºn£gkastai (239c5). Socrates 
gradually probes further into the various restrictions and lack of choices afflicting 
both the wretched lover and his beloved, with the vocabulary of ‘compulsion’ 
becoming persistent in the concluding section.46 With the lover thus ‘ruled by 
desire’ and ‘compelled to seek pleasure’, he has lost self-control. Socrates sums 
up this unhappy condition as he speaks of the lover as ‘driven by compulsion and 
frenzy’ (240c7-d1 Øp' ¢n£gkhj te kaˆ o‡strou ™laÚnetai). The language of 
‘frenzy’ now applied directly to the love experience recalls Socrates’ presentation 
of himself in the prologue as ‘sick’ and ‘frenzied with passion’ for hearing 
speeches (228b6-7 nosoànti, sugkorubantiînta). Clearly the familiar theme of 
love-as-madness is sounding but it is interesting to note that the mania vocabulary 
so pronounced in the lyric poems above is thus far absent from the text.47 The 
madness vocabulary that will be so prevalent in Socrates’ second speech first 
appears here in a phrase that refers directly to the eros-as-dunamis passage. 
Socrates describes the lover’s loss of passion as a situation where he actively 
‘changes the ruler within’ (241a2): 
metabalën ¥llon ¥rconta ™n aØtù kaˆ prost£thn, noàn kaˆ swfrosÚnhn 
¢nt' œrwtoj kaˆ man…aj, ¥lloj gegonëj lšlhqen t¦ paidik£. 
                                                 
45 The theme of divine possession continues at 241e3-5 (ØpÕ tîn Numfîn... ™nqousi£sw). The 
suggestion is that, were Socrates to continue, his discourse would be like an innocent girl 
overtaken by the force of lyric poetry. 
46 240c4 ¢nagka‹on; 240e1 ¢n£gkhj; 241b4-7 Øp' ¢n£gkhj... ¢nagk£zetai... Øp' ¢n£gkhj; and 
241c2 ¢nagka‹on. Socrates sets out the indignities forced upon the lovers by their own 
behavioural ‘compulsions’ and the ‘necessities’ of the situation.  
47 The closest negative term used for the condition of love by Lysias was nose‹n (231d and 236b.) 
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he changes in himself and adopts a different ruler and master, sense and sanity in 
place of love and madness, and has become a different person without his 
beloved’s realising it. (tr. Rowe) 
The terms ¥rconta and prost£thn clearly recall the political vocabulary of 237d-
238c and the passage thus presents the lover’s change of heart as the 
establishment of a new inner government—with a changeover in power from eros 
and mania to good sense and sophrosune. By thus setting the contrast between 
rational self-control and the madness of love, Socrates draws out the polarity that 
was implicit in Lysias’ speech. The key term mania would thus seem to have been 
kept in reserve both to add particular weight at this point and to signal 
developments to come. Through this switch in inner ruler (metabalèn) the lover 
changes his very identity, a fact not realised by the beloved until the change starts 
to affect his behaviour, with metabalèn repeated at 241b5 to show how the 
internal switch causes external turnarounds.48 The main achievement of Socrates’ 
first speech is to explain that the external behaviour of the lover is caused by his 
own internal experience. What will follow in his second speech is a much closer 
analysis of the internal changes themselves.  
As Plato’s account of eros builds gradually through the three speeches, there 
is a concomitant development at the level of discourse. Plato begins in Lysias’ 
speech with standard prose formulations for the lover’s ‘sickness’ and poor 
judgement. In the first part of Socrates’ response to Lysias there is a shift to more 
abstract terminology as eros itself, rather than the person of the lover, becomes the 
main focus of attention. Love emerges more clearly as an independent, active 
force and by the end of this speech the individual’s rational self-control is set 
squarely against the potential dominance of love as mania.49 The language of this 
account moves beyond standard formulations but it is in Socrates’ second speech 
that the terminology for love’s power will become more heightened and indeed 
poetic. As Plato explores what happens inside a soul experiencing love, the 
allusions to lyric poetry increase and reminiscences of particular poems can be 
more clearly heard. In the narrative of soul Plato will not only incorporate into his 
prose a number of poetic metaphors for love but will also re-animate them within 
the novel context of tripartition. Such a movement from established to novel 
usage is intrinsic to Plato’s style. Ricoeur (1975, 370) has noted that Plato is adept 
at re-animating established metaphors and is fond of using false etymology as part 
of this process. This point is borne out by Socrates’ etymology at 238c. For the 
derivation of eros from ·èmh (‘force’) anticipates the second speech and its 
transformations of lyric language for love’s power and force.  
                                                 
48 Fortenbaugh (1966), 108-9 regards Phaedrus 241a-b as a particular allusion to Sappho 1, noting 
the common elements as ‘madness, gifts, flight, unwilling chase’. While it is true that Sappho 1 
gives a striking portrayal of these themes, they are also well-established in lyrics other than 
Sappho’s. In addition to the familiar madness motif, flight and pursuit are equally pronounced, for 
example, at Theognis 1299-1304 (profeÚxeai, dièkwn, feÚgeij). Ferrari (1987), 107 sees no 
specific allusion and notes more generally the adoption throughout this speech of the ‘traditional 
erotic themes of dominance, pursuit, and manipulation’.  
49 At the outset of his second speech Socrates uses this critical distinction between the lover as mad 
and the non-lover as sane (244a5 Ð mn ma…netai, Ð d swfrone‹) to summarise the main thesis 
shared by the first two speeches.  
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5. The lyric poets in Socrates’ second speech  
In Socrates’ second speech the theme of love-as-madness is foregrounded and 
given full expression.50 The account of love as a divine madness challenges the 
preference for sanity and self-control that has so far been taken for granted. Plato 
draws on established poetic language for the force of love in the context of his 
discussion of the benefits of mania. In Socrates’ myth a vision of the lover’s 
experience is presented where the power of love is matched by the moving power 
of the soul itself. The discussion of soul begins with the argument on self-motion 
at 245c and develops into an account of tripartition founded on images of moving 
forces. Various critics have offered illuminating accounts of the motive power of 
soul in Plato. In Cornford’s words (1971, 128), the ‘moving force of the soul’ is 
‘the energy of life itself’, while Moline (1981) identifies this energy with desire. 
Commenting on the hydraulic simile for tripartition at Republic 485d-e, Moline 
observes how a person’s desires are driven by the essential energy of soul (1981, 
78): ‘The parts of the psyche are one psyche in that they are but different ways of 
channeling one finite, personal stream of energy or desire.’ On the active nature of 
the desires, Price (1995, 53) has discussed how each part of the soul is ‘the home 
of a family of desires’ and how each family continually strives for its own 
individual ends. Plato’s vision of the dynamic soul is manifest at Phaedrus 245c 
when movement (k…nhsij) is identified as the very essence of soul. Given the 
definition of soul as self-mover, it follows that images of moving forces will be a 
prominent feature of the portrayal of the soul in this speech.  
Where the poets consider the power of love as an external force, Plato, in a 
distinctive and far-reaching move, focuses on the internal struggle of competing 
desires within the erotic experience and so establishes soul as the locus of 
significant action. In scrutinising the ideas of motion and force embedded within 
the lyric vision of love,51 Plato considers the idea that the lover is nevertheless 
capable of an active response and thus he reconfigures the familiar experience of 
the shock of love. In this way Plato transforms the lyrical conception of love as he 
considers how erotic stimulation impacts on the forces already present and active 
within the soul and how the lover can and indeed ought to respond to the stimulus 
of desire. Nevertheless, as he transforms traditional views of love in this way, 
Plato in this remarkable portrayal draws freely on the erotic language of the lyric 
poets themselves. In my treatment of Socrates’ second speech the influences of 
Sappho and Anacreon will be assessed alongside those of Stesichorus, Alcaeus, 
Theognis and Ibycus to show how the poetic language of the force of love is 
transformed to express and support the theories of Forms and tripartition. The 
                                                 
50 The vocabulary of mania increases and continues throughout the speech: 244a5 ma…netai; 244a6 
man…an; 244a7 di¦ man…aj; 244b7 man…an; 245a5 man…aj; 245a8 tîn mainomšnwn; 245c1 man…a; 
249d5 man…aj; 249d8 manikîj; 249e3 tÁj man…aj; 251a6 man…aj; 251d8 ™mman»j; 253c5 
manšntoj; 256b6 qe…a man…a; 256d6 tÁj ™rwtikÁj man…aj. Other madness vocabulary in the 
speech is ‘disturbed’ (245b4 toà kekinhmšnou); ‘in Bacchic frenzy’ (245a2 ™kbakceÚousa); 
‘stung to madness’ (251d6 o„str´); and ‘raving’ (251d8 lutt´). 
51 Calame (1999), 16, on eros in lyric poetry: ‘Eros is thus characterized by the same dynamism as 
that conveyed by our own conception of aspiration, aims, desire.’ On the connection in Phaedrus 
between motion and emotion, see Lebeck (1972), 269-71, 280-2 and 284-7. 
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allusions to lyric will be traced through four major episodes within the myth: how 
the soul loses its wings (§5.1 ‘Horses, wings and chariots’, 246a6-248e5); how it 
regains its wings through memory of beauty (§5.2 ‘Memory’, 248e5-250e1); how, 
under the stimulus of beauty, the wings regrow (§5.3 ‘Regrowth’, 250e1-253c6); 
and how the charioteer seeks to control his team when all are excited by beauty 
(§5.4 ‘Self-control’, 253c7-256e2).  
5.1 Horses, wings and chariots (246a6-248e5) 
The power of the soul is conveyed at 246a in the striking image of the winged 
team of charioteer and horses: 
™oikštw d¾ sumfÚtJ dun£mei Øpoptšrou zeÚgouj te kaˆ ¹niÒcou. 
Let it then resemble the combined power of a winged team of horses and their 
charioteer. (tr. Rowe)  
The abstract noun dÚnamij recalls Socrates’ earlier question on the nature of love: 
‘what sort of dunamis does it have?’ (237c-d). This short sentence introduces at 
once a number of motifs and yet keeps them discrete. First there is sumfÚtJ 
dun£mei (‘a naturally conjoined power’), a phrase that in itself indicates a unity 
achieved from distinct elements. This is a literal formulation for the power of soul. 
Second there are the images: the wing, the pair of horses and the charioteer. The 
three elements of the tripartite soul are set out separately in the horses and 
charioteer, while the wing image works to maintain unity, since it relates to both 
horses and driver through its constant application in the myth to the soul as a 
whole.52 The two motifs of wing and team will interact very closely in the 
subsequent account but will also function at times independently.  
The first motif of the soul image at 246a is the wing. Plato uses the image of 
the wing, introduced by the adjective Øpoptšrou (‘winged’), to represent 
perfection.53 Socrates tells how the nature of mortal and immortal souls is closely 
related and tells how ‘all soul’ (246b6 yuc¾ p©sa) ‘ranges about the whole 
universe’ (246b7 p£nta d oÙranÕn peripole‹). This is a literal, albeit unusual, 
formulation: since the essence of soul is self-motion it is appropriate that its 
natural activity should be to move. In the next sentence the verb peripole‹ 
(‘traverses’) is picked up by metewropore‹ (‘travels above the earth’) as the soul 
continues its movement around the universe. The metaphor of the wing is 
introduced alongside this movement to denote the perfect condition of soul in this 
state (246b7-c1): telša... oâsa kaˆ ™pterwmšnh metewropore‹. Conversely, the 
loss of perfection is represented by the soul’s loss of wings (246c2 
pterorru»sasa; 246d4 tÁj tîn pterîn ¢pobolÁj, ¢porre‹), which in the logic 
of the imagery necessitates a fall to earth. The use of the image of the wing to 
represent perfection is explained at 246d6-7, as the wing is viewed as having its 
own natural ‘power’, that of carrying ‘heavy’ objects heavenwards: pšfuken ¹ 
pteroà dÚnamij tÕ ™mbriqj ¥gein ¥nw metewr…zousa Î tÕ tîn qeîn gšnoj 
o„ke‹. The wing-as-perfection motif draws on the familiar spatial metaphor 
                                                 
52 On the specific location of the soul’s ‘wings’, see Price (1992), 245.  
53 On Plato’s wing image, see Pender (2000), 155-62.  
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whereby that which is close to the upper divine realm is superior in quality to that 
which is below. There follows the note that the wings of the soul have their own 
‘plumage’ (tÕ tÁj yucÁj ptšrwma), which like other natural phenomena can 
grow stronger and weaker (e1-4) depending on nourishment (tršfetai). At this 
point the focus of the text pans outwards again to the universal scene where the 
mythological king of the gods is engaged in the task of divine management. The 
wings of his perfection are located specifically on the chariot he drives (246e4-5): 
Ð mn d¾ mšgaj ¹gemën ™n oÙranù ZeÚj, ™laÚnwn pthnÕn ¤rma, prîtoj 
poreÚetai, diakosmîn p£nta kaˆ špimeloÚmenoj: 
First in the heavens travels Zeus, the great leader, driving a winged chariot, 
putting all things in order and caring for all. (tr. Rowe) 
The mention of Zeus’ winged chariot directly recalls 246a and the image of soul 
as charioteer and horses, as it re-combines the two motifs of wings and horses. In 
this episode the final uses of the wing image build on the picture established so 
far: the idea that the wing is ‘nourished’ reappears at 248c2 as its elevating 
function is again noted (kouf…zetai / tršfetai). Now the food for the soul’s wing 
is identified as the celestial vision of the Forms, while the loss of perfection 
imaged in the loss of wings (pterorru»sV 248c8) is now specifically attributed to 
the soul’s inability to maintain sight of this vision.  
At this point of Plato’s narrative there is as yet no erotic application of the 
wing image: the emphasis is solely on the motifs of elevation and proximity to the 
divine as expressions of perfection. However, there are two particular passages 
from love lyric which may have provided inspiration for Plato’s use of the wing as 
a mediator between divine and human realms: Sappho 1 and Anacreon 378. In 
Sappho 1, a cletic hymn, the goddess Aphrodite responds to Sappho’s prayer for a 
visitation. The moment of epiphany is described in striking terms (8-13):  
                                Ãlqej 
¥rm' ÙpasdeÚxaisa: k£loi dš s' «gon 
êkeej stroàqoi perˆ g©j mela…naj 
pÚkna d…nnentej ptšr' ¢p' çr£nw‡qe- 
roj di¦ mšssw, 
aya d' ™x…konto: 
(You) came with chariot yoked: beautiful swift sparrows whirring fast-beating 
wings brought you above the dark earth down from heaven through the mid-air, 
and soon [suddenly] they arrived. (tr. Campbell)  
Aphrodite’s chariot is drawn by sparrows and the verses draw attention to both the 
rapid movement of the wings (pÚkna d…nnentej ptšr')54 and the distance crossed 
through the space between immortal and mortal worlds (¢p' çr£nw‡qeroj di¦ 
mšssw). In Anacreon’s poem the journey is from earth to heaven as a frustrated 
lover is driven to seek out Eros in his heavenly abode (378): 
¢napštomai d¾ prÕj ”Olumpon pterÚgessi koÚfVj  
di¦ tÕn ”Erwt': oÙ g¦r ™moˆ <...> qšlei sunhb©n.  
                                                 
54 Stanley (1976) sees Sappho’s phrase as a deliberate echo of Iliad 11.454.  
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See, I fly up on light wings to Olympus in search of Love; for (the boy) does not 
wish to enjoy the fun of youth with me. (tr. Campbell) 
Both the winged chariot in Sappho and the lover’s ability to fly in Anacreon draw 
on the established literary and iconographical tradition of Eros as a winged god, 
which will be explored below in relation to Plato’s development of the erotic 
applications of the wing image (§5.2 Memory). 
The second motif of the soul image at 246a is that of the team of horses and 
charioteer. As the image is introduced the emphasis is on the power of the team 
(sumfÚtJ dun£mei) and this is soon joined by its corollary—the issue of control. 
The need for control is raised first through ¥rcwn (literally, ‘ruler’) as an 
alternative term for the charioteer. This control recalls the vocabulary of inner rule 
used in Socrates’ first speech (237d7 ¥rconte; 238a1 ¢rx£shj; 238e3 ¢rcomšnJ; 
241a3 ¥rconta) and thus works as a structuring theme. The particular focus on 
control is then maintained through the abstract noun ¹niÒchsij for the act of 
charioteering, and through the adjective eÙ»nia (247b2), which draws attention to 
the reins that are part of the charioteer’s apparatus of command and steering. Later 
the level of skill of the charioteer is the determining factor in controlling the 
power of the horses (248a4-6 qoruboumšnh ØpÕ tîn †ppwn; biazomšnwn d tîn 
†ppwn) and in counter-balancing—or not—their downward pull (247b4-5 m¾ 
kalîj Ãn teqrammšnoj tîn ¹niÒcwn; 248b2 kak…v ¹niÒcwn). Critics have 
commented on the poetic influences on this image of horses and chariot. As 
Slaveva-Griffin has rightly observed, the chariot ride is an allusion to Zeus’ 
chariot ride in Homer’s Iliad.55 But she has further argued that the more important 
allusion here is to the chariot of Parmenides’ prologue (2003, 227): 
I argue that the Phaedrus’ myth of the soul as a charioteer exemplifies Plato’s 
literary and philosophic appropriation of the charioteer allegory in Parmenides’ 
proem... 
For Slaveva-Griffin the main parallel between this image in Parmenides and Plato 
is that (230): 
in both authors the charioteer’s journey represents travel beyond the beaten paths 
of human perception in a search for what true being is.  
This suggestion of an echo of Parmenides, anticipated by duBois in 1985,56 is 
interesting since it opens up the question of how far Plato in this text is placing 
himself also within a tradition of philosophical poetry. But for my purpose in 
assessing the impact of lyric poetry, it is notable how much more useful to Plato in 
this speech are various lyric images of horses. Plato’s image of the chariot is 
‘lyricised’ when it is developed to direct attention to the processes involved in 
                                                 
55 Slaveva-Griffin (2003), 232: ‘The poetic tradition most important for Parmenides’ (and later 
Plato’s) allegory of the soul as charioteer is that of Homer, specifically Zeus’ chariot ride at Il. 
8.41-52, the gates of heaven through which Hera’s chariot passes at Il. 5.748-52, and Telemachus’ 
journey from Pylos to Sparta in Book 3 of the Odyssey.’ In the case of Plato’s depiction of soul in 
Phaedrus only the first parallel here seems relevant.  
56 DuBois (1985), 98, on Phdr. 246a: ‘The image of the chariot probably alludes to Parmenides 
(28B1).’ DuBois also compares Plato’s image of horses with the dream of Atossa in Aeschylus 
Persae 181-99. 
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actually controlling the horses. The key difference between the equestrian imagery 
of lyric and Parmenides’ chariot is that the lyric images have a much closer focus 
on the action of charioteering itself and therefore on how one force can overcome 
another, which is the chief concern of tripartition. 
The equestrian imagery for sexual desire and activity is used by various lyric 
poets, including Anacreon.57 Theognis compares the boy to a horse and the lover 
to his driver58 in two similar poems (1249-52, 1267-70): 
pa‹, sÝ mn aÜtwj †ppJ, ...  
     aâqij ™pˆ staqmoÝj ½luqej ¹metšrouj 
¹n…ocÒn te poqîn ¢gaqÕn...  
Boy, you are like a horse,... you have come again to my stable desiring a good 
driver.59
pa‹j te kaˆ †ppoj Ómoion œcei nÒon: oÜte g¦r †ppoj 
     ¹n…ocon kla…ei ke…menon ™n kon…V, 
¢ll¦ tÕn Ûsteron ¥ndra fšrei kriqa‹si koresqe…j: 
     æj d' aÜtwj kaˆ pa‹j tÕn pareÒnta file‹. 
Boy and horse have a similar mind; for the horse doesn’t weep as his driver lies 
in the dust, but has his fill of barley and carries another later; in the same way a 
boy loves the one he’s with at the time. 
Ibycus also uses the image of horse and chariot for a lover unwilling but 
compelled to re-enter the erotic arena (287):60
”Eroj aâtš me kuanšoisin ØpÕ 
     blef£roij takšr' Ômmasi derkÒmenoj 
khl»masi pantodapo‹j ™j ¢pei- 
     ra d…ktua KÚpridoj ™sb£llei: 
Ã m¦n tromšw nin ™percÒmenon, 
éste feršzugoj †ppoj ¢eqlofÒroj potˆ g»rv 
¢škwn sÝn Ôcesfi qoo‹j ™j ¤millan œba. 
Again Love, looking at me meltingly from under his dark eyelids, hurls me with 
his manifold enchantments into the boundless nets of the Cyprian. How I fear his 
onset, as a prize-winning horse still bearing the yoke in his old age goes 
unwillingly with swift chariot to the race. (tr. Campbell) 
Anacreon echoes this equestrian imagery of Theognis and Ibycus. His famous 
‘Thracian filly’ poem (417) follows Theognis’ directly sexual use of the image of 
horse and rider: 
pîle QrVik…h, t… d» me  
     loxÕn Ômmasi blšpousa  
nhlšwj feÚgeij, doke‹j dš  
     m' oÙdn e„dšnai sofÒn;  
‡sqi toi, kalîj mn ¥n toi  
                                                 
57 On this imagery in Anacreon and Theognis, see Calame (1999), 27 and 165-6. 
58 In a third poem, 1357-8, it is the lover who is compared to an animal on whose neck lies a heavy 
yoke: a„eˆ paidof…lVsin ™pˆ zugÕn aÙcšni ke‹tai / dÚslofon, ¢rgalšon mnÁma filoxen…hj. 
59 These translations are my own. 
60 Rowe (1986), 166 notes the similarity between Socrates’ second speech and this poem of Ibycus, 
adding that ‘Plato himself knew the poem well, since he paraphrases it at Parmenides 137a’. 
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     tÕn calinÕn ™mb£loimi,  
¹n…aj d' œcwn stršfoim…  
     s' ¢mfˆ tšrmata drÒmou:  
nàn d leimîn£j te bÒskeai  
     koàf£ te skirtîsa pa…zeij,  
dexiÕn g¦r ƒppope…rhn  
     oÙk œceij ™pemb£thn.  
Thracian filly, why do you look at me from the corner of your eye and flee 
stubbornly from me, supposing that I have no skill? Let me tell you, I could 
neatly put the bridle on you and with the reins in my hand wheel you round the 
turnpost of the racecourse; instead, you graze in the meadows and frisk and 
frolic lightly, since you have no skilled horseman to ride you. (tr. Campbell) 
Anacreon uses a less directly sexual, but nevertheless erotic, image of controlling 
horses in 346.8-9, which highlights Aphrodite’s lšpadnon, the broad leather strap 
that fastens the yoke to the neck, legs and frame of the horse:  
†]na KÚprij ™k lep£dnwn  
.... a[j k]atšdhsen †ppouj: 
where Cyprian Aphrodite tied her... horses freed from the yoke. (tr. Campbell) 
But the most striking parallel with Plato’s use of the charioteering image for soul 
at Phaedrus 246a is found in Anacreon’s haunting poem 360: 
ð pa‹ parqšnion blšpwn 
d…zhma… se, sÝ d' oÙ koe‹j, 
oÙk e„dëj Óti tÁj ™mÁj 
yucÁj ¹nioceÚeij. 
Boy with the girlish glance, I seek you, but you do not notice, not knowing that 
you hold the reins of my soul. (tr. Campbell) 
On the striking phrase tÁj ™mÁj / yucÁj ¹nioceÚeij Calame explains (1999, 19): 
‘love holds the reins that control the vital breath called psukhê by the Greeks.’ 
Although it is more correct to say that it is the boy who holds the reins, the point 
stands that the control is exerted over the lover’s very life-force. Since the more 
common site of the impact of eros in lyric poetry is the phrenes or thumos,61 
Anacreon’s image stands out as unusual. While the noun yuc» in Plato 
undoubtedly has a different range of meanings, it still retains its links with the 
standard Greek usage of life-force. Thus Anacreon’s formulation of equestrian 
imagery for the control over the lover’s very yuc» seems to me an important 
influence on Plato’s vocabulary and image-making for the tripartite soul.62 
Indeed, Plato’s echo of this poem at 246a seems to represent the clearest instance 
of Anacreontic influence in Phaedrus.  
                                                 
61 For phrenes, see e.g. Stesichorus 222b; Alcaeus 5; Sappho 3, 47 and 48; Theognis 66, 87, 122, 
593, and 657; Ibycus 282c fr.1, fr. 29, and 286; and Anacreon 346. For thumos, see e.g. Stesichorus 
S11 and S148; Alcaeus 34 and 129; Sappho 1, 4, 5 and 60; Theognis 213, 630-1, 645, 695 and 877; 
and Ibycus 317b. 
62 Hackforth (1952), 77 notes that this poem of Anacreon is an ‘early and apposite example’ of ‘the 
common metaphorical use of ¹nioceÚein and its cognates’ for ruling.  
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Other critics have duly noted these parallels between Plato and the horses of 
lyric. Fortenbaugh (1966, 109) identifies Plato’s image of charioteer and horses as 
an allusion to Anacreon’s ‘Thracian filly’ poem (417) noting ‘Plato uses a 
metaphor of driving horses to illustrate the phenomenon of conflicting desires’. 
DuBois (1985, 44) also notes the parallel with the Thracian filly and further 
compares Anacreon 346: 
In a fragmentary pederastic poem, Anakreon (346) describes Aphrodite tethering 
her horses in a field of hyacinths. Horses often connote the exciting of desire, the 
will to tame an unbroken filly (Anakreon 84 [417]), or the indomitable will 
itself, as in Plato’s representation of the charioteer of the Phaedrus (246a).  
DuBois’ comments on the erotic horses are helpful. It is true that horses in lyric 
poetry connote the ‘exciting of desire’ and the wish to ‘mount’ and impose 
control. For the significance of the grazing horses in the seduction meadows lies 
in the fact that they represent quiescent power and thereby the latent sexuality of 
the girls at play. As duBois observes, Anacreon’s would-be lover in 417 imagines 
‘taming the unbroken filly’ and this sexual image can indeed be broadened to 
apply to the human will itself, as exemplified in Plato’s account of tripartition 
(246a-248e). Ferrari is the first critic to observe, albeit in passing, Plato’s allusion 
to Anacreon 360. Comparing echoes of Sappho, he comments (1986, 265 n.21): 
Socrates seems to make similar use of snatches from his other named source, 
Anacreon. Where the latter declares a beautiful boy to be the ‘charioteer’ of his 
soul (Anacreon 360, Page), Socrates describes the effects of the boy’s beauty 
within the lover’s soul in terms of an allegorical charioteer (253c7 sq).63
In Genres in Dialogue Nightingale takes a similar line and further connects 
Anacreon’s charioteer with Plato’s tripartite psychology (1995, 158 n.51):  
Note, too, that Plato’s depiction of the tripartite soul echoes Anacreon’s address 
to a boy whom he calls the ‘charioteer of my heart’ (tÁj ™mÁj / yucÁj 
¹nioceÚeij, fr. 360 PMG); Sappho’s declaration in fr 51 PLF—‘I do not know 
what I should do; my thoughts go in two directions’ (oÙk od' Ôtti qšw: d…ca 
moi t¦ no»mmata) may also anticipate Plato’s psychology... Anacreon’s mention 
of the charioteer invites us to posit a direct influence.  
Nightingale (133) shows how Phaedrus ‘repeatedly signals its rapprochement 
with “unphilosophical” language’ and judges (149) that Plato in this work allows 
lyric ‘a relatively autonomous role’.64 I support Nightingale’s assessment that 
Anacreon’s charioteer is a ‘direct influence’ on Plato’s text and accept the 
suggestion that the lyric poets’ conception of inner division, caused by eros, is 
also echoing in the account of tripartition. In the extant fragments of the six poets 
in this study, Sappho and Anacreon alone offer similar reflections on the 
contradictory effects of eros. Thus the echoes in inner division can be seen as 
                                                 
63 Ferrari (1986), 107 also contrasts Anacreon 360 with 417 to support his point that in love poetry 
the beloved is not necessarily passive. 
64 Using a distinction between ‘active and passive double-voiced discourse’, Nightingale (148-62) 
considers Plato’s engagement with lyric poetry and judges that in Phaedrus Plato refuses ‘parody’ 
(which would involve ‘domination’) in favour of ‘passive double-voiced discourse’, where the 
author allows ‘the alien genre to play an active and relatively autonomous role in his text’ (149). 
25 
E.E. PENDER, SAPPHO AND ANACREON IN PLATO’S Phaedrus 
allusions to Sappho and Anacreon in particular, since for both poets the erotic 
experience is so perplexing that it results in contradictory impulses and feelings. 
Thus Sappho’s ‘I am in two minds’ would seem to be echoed in Anacreon’s 
statement (428):  
™ršw te dhâte koÙk ™ršw 
kaˆ ma…nomai koÙ ma…nomai. 
Once again I love and I do not love, I am mad and I am not mad. (tr. Campbell) 65
I am not claiming that either Sappho or Anacreon is the inspiration for Plato’s 
theory of tripartition. The Socratic paradoxes and Plato’s own reasoning on human 
motivation are necessary and sufficient causes for the development of this theory. 
However, for this exploration into why Plato at 235c names and praises Sappho 
and Anacreon in particular, these poems on conflicting experience and judgements 
seem to provide useful comparanda, offering as they do a vision of human 
experience that is in line with Plato’s own account. These comparable poems offer 
a relevant and familiar poetic view in the light of which the novel theory of 
tripartition can be more easily explained. While the poets have given expression to 
the inner conflict caused by love, Plato will explain how this conflict is not due 
simply to the extremes of erotic experience but is rather a constant factor in all 
human behaviour.  
My final point on the imagery of horses at 246a concerns the relationship of 
this section of the dialogue with the prologue. The poetic motif of the eroticised 
landscape would seem to be recalled through vocabulary that suggests the grazing 
horses of the prelude meadows. The distinctive terms are nom» and leimèn at 
248b7-c1. The uppermost image at this point is that of the nourishment of the 
soul. Whereas the ‘mind of a god’ is nourished (trefomšnh) on insight and 
knowledge (247d1-2) and whereas the divine souls in the extracelestial circuit 
‘feast upon’ truth (˜stiaqe‹sa 247e3), the horses of the divine souls are fed ‘at 
their manger’ (247e5 f£tnhn) on ambrosia and nectar. This humorous aside 
establishes the superiority of the Forms over other mythological divinities: in this 
new vision of perfect reality the mythological food of the gods is merely the food 
given to horses. A similar food metaphor is used for the experience of the non-
divine souls. Despite the aim of these souls to achieve truth, often they must make 
do with the inferior ‘food of appearance’ (trofÍ doxastÍ 248b5). The key 
‘meadow’ vocabulary comes in the assertion (248b5-c2): 
oá d' ›nec' ¹ poll¾ spoud¾ tÕ ¢lhqe…aj „de‹n ped…on oá ™stin, ¼ te d¾ 
pros»kousa yucÁj tù ¢r…stJ nom¾ ™k toà ™ke‹ leimînoj tugc£nei oâsa, 
¼ te toà pteroà fÚsij, ú yuc¾ kouf…zetai, toÚtJ tršfetai.  
The cause of their great eagerness to see the plain of truth where it lies is that the 
pasturage which is fitting for the best part of the soul comes from the meadow 
                                                 
65 Commenting on Anacreon 428, Calame (1999), 18 observes the connection with Sappho 51: 
‘the poet can experience erotic desire in its pure state, simultaneously sensitive to both the 
madness that it induces and its absence... Reduced to a simple condition for the duration of the 
present tense, the contrasts in the nature of Eros become so strong that the poet uses contradictory 
terms rather than merely contrary or contrasting ones: now Eros is not simply both sweet and 
stinging, but is both active and absent, all at once. In similar fashion Sappho... seems... to be 
feeling two desires at once.’ 
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there, and that the nature of the wing which lifts up the soul is nourished by this. 
(tr. Rowe) 
Thus the realm of the Forms is now identified as a ‘meadow’ offering ‘pasturage’ 
for reason. Given the familiar idea of horses grazing in lush pastures, it is ironic 
that the best part of the soul that seeks its proper ‘pasturage’ is not the horses but 
their charioteer. But the horses within both the divine and non-divine souls are not 
fitted to receive this pasturage simply because they are not rational enough. The 
pasturage and meadow vocabulary would therefore seem to function similarly to 
that of the ambrosia and nectar: namely, there is a transposition where what is 
superior in mythology is determinedly supplanted by the perfection of the Forms. 
In this case the Forms provide a meadow that surpasses even the most idyllic of 
lush landscapes in poetry. While the eroticised meadows of poetry and myth are 
the scenes of divine epiphany, these traditional divinities are merely the 
Olympians, and for a full encounter with divine truth, the only suitable location is 
the erotic meadow of the Forms. Thus Plato sets out how the best part of us, 
reason, is strengthened by the most sublime nourishment possible, available only 
from the most perfect setting possible. Read in this way the equestrian imagery of 
246a interacts with the leimèn of 248c to furnish the final missing motif of the 
erotic meadow: the grazing horses. 
To conclude, this episode of the myth contains various allusions to lyric 
poetry. The motif of wings suggests the particular influence of Sappho and 
Anacreon, as does the connection between tripartition and the inner division. The 
horses of the myth draw on the established use of equestrian imagery in lyric and 
also recall the seduction meadow motif. It is within this episode that Plato makes, 
in my opinion, his clearest allusion to Anacreon—with his own horses and 
charioteer borrowing directly from the scenario and vocabulary of Anacreon 360. 
5.2 Memory (248e5-250e1) 
The second episode of the myth tells how the soul regains its wings, and 
introduces the theme of recollection.66 I will analyse Plato’s debts to lyric here by 
two approaches: first by considering his use of particular lyric motifs and 
vocabulary and second by showing how the account of recollection in Phaedrus is 
shaped under the influence of Sappho’s insights on the power of memory.  
Let us begin, then, with the particular poetic motifs that feature in this 
episode. Recollection is an intellectual re-discovery of the Forms and is presented 
as both a journey back to origins (e.g. 248e6 ¢fikne‹tai; 249a5 ¢pšrcontai; 
249a7 ™lqoàsai; 249b2 ¢fiknoÚmenai; b4 ¢fikne‹tai; b6 ¼xei) and an erotic 
encounter with a beloved. Four further motifs are used to help to explain how 
recollection changes the nature of the soul. These motifs can all be traced back to 
portrayals of eros in lyric poetry: wings, contact with divinity, madness and the 
radiance of beauty. As elsewhere in the text, the particular influences of Sappho 
and Anacreon can be discerned in the use of these motifs.  
                                                 
66 On the theory itself, see Scott (1995), section 1. Everson (1990) provides useful discussion and 
bibliography.  
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At 248e5 the narrative of the myth turns from why the soul loses its wings to 
how it regains them. The change of direction mirrors that of the soul away from a 
progressive descent into worse lives (248c) and back towards its point of origin 
(248e6 e„j mn g¦r tÕ aÙtÕ Óqen ¼kei). 
Wings are used at 249a1 (pteroàtai) in conjunction with the soul’s return to 
its origin. If the philosophical life is chosen three times in succession, the souls 
become winged (pterwqe‹sai) and are able to ‘depart’. The upward impulse 
caused by such virtuous lives is also formulated as the soul being ‘uplifted by 
Justice’ (ØpÕ tÁj D…khj koufisqe‹sai).67 Rationality is presented specifically as 
the ability to organise perceptions ‘from many into one’ (249b7-c1) and this 
collecting together is identified as (c2-3): 
¢n£mnhsij ™ke…nwn ¤ pot' eden ¹mîn ¹ yuc¾ sumporeuqe‹sa qeù  
a recollection of those things which our soul once saw when it travelled in 
company with a god. (tr. Rowe) 
The journey alongside a god functions as the guarantor of the soul’s rational 
capacities, with proximity to the divine serving as a spatial image for superior 
rational prowess. The text spells out the interconnectedness of reason, wings and 
divinity (249c4-6): 
diÕ d¾ dika…wj mÒnh pteroàtai ¹ toà filosÒfou di£noia: prÕj g¦r 
™ke…noij ¢e… ™stin mn»mV kat¦ dÚnamin, prÕj oŒsper qeÕj ín qe‹Òj ™stin. 
Hence it is with justice that only the mind of the philosopher becomes winged: 
for so far as it can it is [always] close, through memory, to those things his 
closeness to which gives god his divinity. (tr. Rowe) 
The wings indicate rationality since their motion upwards allows proximity to the 
‘very things which’ (prÕj ™ke…noij... prÕj oŒsper) bestow divinity on any divine 
being. In this remarkable statement Plato establishes the Forms as the most perfect 
and superior entities that stand as the fixed point for all souls to move towards and 
so gain access to the secure knowledge that is the basis for the proper exercise of 
rationality. The (human and imperfect) philosopher achieves ‘closeness’ to the 
Forms through memory (mn»mV) and making the ‘right use of such reminders’ 
(toioÚtoij... Øpomn»masin Ñrqîj crèmenoj). By remembering the Forms the 
human soul is able to make correct judgements about reality. Memory is required 
since soul has been estranged, since its ‘fall’, from its divine origins close to truth. 
By recalling its former existence and level of knowing the human soul becomes 
close again to it. Through memory the human soul re-activates its rational powers 
and in this process improves its nature, thereby making it more akin to the ‘divine 
company’ of which it was once part.  
The intellectual event of recollection is spoken of in the traditional language 
of religious initiation (249c7-8 telšouj... telet¦j teloÚmenoj, tšleoj), for in 
initiation rituals the participants are likewise understood as coming into contact 
with god. In this myth the divine realm consists of both the immortal souls (the 
traditional ‘gods’) and the Forms in the region above the heavens (247c3 
                                                 
67 The association between the terms is familiar from Anacreon 378: pterÚgessi koÚfVj. 
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Øperour£nion). Although it is notable that the Forms are not directly described as 
‘divine’ in the myth,68 various formulations point to this interpretation: they are 
‘holy’ (250a4 ƒerîn; cf. ™n ¡gnù b£qrJ at 254b7); the Form of beauty is 
‘blessed’ (250b6 makar…an); the revelations of the Forms are ‘blissful’ (250c3 
eÙda…mona); and at 249d1 they must be included in the generic category of ‘the 
divine’ (tù qe…J),69 since it is through the closeness to ‘the divine’ that 
‘nourishment’ is gained and since at 248b6 the nourishment comes from the ‘plain 
of Truth’ which is an appellation for the Forms.  
The madness theme re-enters as the process of ‘coming close’ to the divine is 
at 249c8-d1 viewed alternatively as the ‘standing aside’ from human concerns 
(™xist£menoj / kaˆ prÕj... gignÒmenoj). This change in values causes the 
philosopher to be regarded by ordinary people as mad (parakinîn 249d2). 
Socrates is keen to correct this unenlightened perception and renames the state as 
divine possession (™nqousi£zwn). In a deft touch the ignorance of the masses is 
attributed to their ‘not noticing/forgetting’ (lšlhqen) what is actually the case. 
Therefore as the philosopher recollects, he separates himself from those who 
forget and Socrates’ two competing terms for the philosopher’s experience—
parakinîn and ™nqousi£zwn—relate to themes in lyric poetry. While the idea of 
‘divine possession’ will be reframed in the next episode of the myth (250e1-
253c6: see §5.3), the various ideas involved in the notion of parakinšw can be 
explored here.  
The verb parakinšw has a number of relevant senses for this passage. In its 
most literal usage it means ‘move aside’ and in this sense works together with 
™xist£menoj (249c8) to denote the positive choice of the philosopher to turn aside 
from the human and towards the divine. Second it means ‘be disturbed’ or ‘out of 
one’s senses’, which aligns it with the general madness vocabulary of the text. But 
in this second sense it is also used to mean ‘be highly excited’. This is important 
since the account of recollecting truth will now be described increasingly in terms 
of erotic arousal. In support of this notion of arousal the wing image is deployed 
so that its primary connotation is no longer that of elevation and perfection but of 
rapid movement indicating excitement. The fourth kind of madness is identified 
specifically as love and this experience is now reformulated as (249d5-e1): 
the madness of the man who on seeing beauty (k£lloj) here on earth and being 
reminded (¢namimnVskÒmenoj) of true beauty becomes winged and fluttering 
with eagerness to fly upwards (pterîta… te kaˆ ¢napteroÚmenoj 
proqumoÚmenoj ¢naptšsqai) but unable to leave the ground... causes him to be 
regarded as mad (manikîj diake…menoj). (tr. Rowe)  
The animation of the philosopher remembering the Forms is now identified as 
erotic arousal. First the madness is caused by a memory triggered specifically by 
beauty. Second, the philosopher experiencing this madness is described as ‘the 
                                                 
68 In contrast, for example, with Symposium 211e3: aÙtÕ tÕ qe‹on kalÒn. 
69 The relationship between the Forms and ‘the divine’ in the myth is not entirely straightforward. 
For example, the definition of the ‘divine’ (tÕ d qe‹on) at 246d8-e1 includes the attribute sofÒn, 
and it is far from clear how a static Form might be ‘wise’. This, however, is a question strictly 
extraneous to the present discussion.  
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man who loves the beautiful’ (249e3-4 Ð ™rîn tîn kalîn), who is therefore 
‘called a lover’ (™rast¾j kale‹tai). This careful reconfiguring of the memory of 
truth as a lover’s response stirs the root of the word filosof…a (‘love of wisdom’) 
through its redefinition as the erotic response to truth. The transition between the 
intellectual endeavour of reasoning and the desire of the lover is eased through the 
feelings of eagerness and excitement generated in both cases. The image of the 
mad lover’s internal fluttering recalls the impact of eros in lyric poetry and adopts 
its image of Eros as a winged figure. 
The traditional iconography of Eros as a winged figure is reviewed by Calame 
(1999, 31, 65-6, 81, 156). Evidence for Eros as a winged, or indeed flying, 
adolescent boy and associated imagery is adduced from myth, art and poetry, 
including Sappho 22.11-13 («j se dhâte pÒqoj t.[ / ¢mfipÒtatai / t¦n k£lan: 
Calame 1999, 31). To this evidence can be added Sappho 21.8 (pštatai) and 
Anacreon 379b (pterÚgwn... parapetšsqw), where in each case the context 
suggests that the subject is Eros. By extension the poets transfer the wings of 
Love to the lover’s own heart so that the fluttering within serves as an image of 
their erotic excitement and arousal. In Sappho 31.5-6 the fluttering response is 
caused particularly by the sight of the beloved (tÒ m' Ã m£n / kard…an ™n 
st»qesin ™ptÒaisen). The same motif and verb are used by Alcaeus and 
Anacreon. As Alcaeus in 283.3-5 presents Helen’s erotic madness (™km£neisa), 
he says that love has ‘excited her heart’ ([™]pt[Òaise qàmon). In Anacreon 346 fr. 
1.11-12 the appearance of the beautiful boy in the seduction meadow excites the 
desires of the onlookers (di' ¤ssa polloˆ / pol]ihtšwn fršnaj ™ptošatai) and 
in 363 the poet asks a lover preparing for seduction: t… mn pšteai; (‘why are you 
all of a flutter?’). The connection between madness and this excited state is also 
made by Theognis (1053-4 tîn g¦r mainomšnwn pštetai qumÒj te nÒoj te). 
Similarly, in Sappho 1 the fast-beating wings of the sparrows drawing the 
goddess’ chariot give expression to the animated feelings of the lover at the 
approach of Aphrodite.70 Calame reads the wing image in Anacreon 378 as an 
expression of the lover’s elation (1999, 22-3): ‘... Anacreon, who, as a result of the 
impact of Eros, claims to be as if borne up to Olympus on airy wings.’ Plato’s 
winged soul is similarly borne up to the realm of the Forms by the impact of love, 
through the feelings of excitement generated by the memory of truth and through 
the attendant regrowth of the soul’s wings (to be discussed below in §5.3).  
After the identification of the lover’s madness at 249d-e the narrative 
continues with its account of recollection (250a1 ¢namimnÇskesqai; 250a4 
l»qhn; a5 tÁj mn»mhj; 250c7 mn»mV) and the love story of rediscovering the 
Forms is further developed, again drawing on lyric vocabulary. Following the 
lover’s fluttering madness at 249d-e there is, again as in lyric, an attendant loss of 
self-control. For the souls still able to remember the Forms are stunned by the 
recognition of their earthly likenesses (250a6-7): ™kpl»ttontai kaˆ oÙkšt' <™n> 
                                                 
70 Such a connection between the rapid movement of wings and the onset of desire, in contrast to 
the slowing of wings and cooling of desire, may also be present in Sappho 42, where a scholion to 
Pindar Pyth. 1.10 reports that ‘Sappho says of the pigeons, “And their heart has grown cold, and 
they slacken their wings”’ (tr. Campbell): ta‹si <d> yàcroj mn œgent' Ñ qàmoj, / p¦r d' ‡eisi 
t¦ ptšra.  
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aØtîn g…gnontai (‘are driven out of their wits with amazement and lose control 
of themselves’). The issue of ‘madness vs self-control’ connects this passage with 
Socrates’ first speech, as is reinforced by the pointed use of the noun sophrosune 
(250b2; cf. 241a3-4 and 241b1).  
The account of recollection is also supported by a further motif from lyric 
poetry: that of beauty as a radiant light. The love story of recollection advances at 
250b5-6 through the portrayal of the Form of beauty as a radiant, shining light: 
k£lloj d tÒt' Ãn „de‹n lamprÒn. In contrast to the likenesses of other Forms in 
which ‘there is no illumination’ (fšggoj), beauty not only ‘shone out’ (250d1 
œlampen) in the divine realm but also on earth appears ‘gleaming most clearly 
through the clearest of our senses’ (250d2-3 di¦ t¾j ™nargest£thj a„sq»sewj 
tîn ¹metšrwn st…lbon ™nargšstata). That the sight of beauty causes erotic 
arousal for the soul is confirmed in significant vocabulary in 250c-e. At 250c7 
Socrates draws attention to his own experience as narrator and philosopher. In the 
act of speaking about the memory of the Forms he has reminded himself of their 
beauty and so has stirred his own ‘longing’ for this past life: 
taàta mn oân mn»mV kecar…sqw, di' ¿n pÒqJ tîn tÒte nàn makrÒtera 
e‡rhtai:  
Let this be our concession to memory, which has made me speak now at some 
length out of longing for what was before. (tr. Rowe) 
He then confirms that the soul’s response to beauty is erotic by comparing how 
the sight of wisdom itself would cause an even greater erotic charge. Wisdom 
would indeed evoke ‘terrible feelings of desire’ (250d4-5 deinoÝj... œrwtaj). The 
Forms are referred to as ‘the other objects of love’ (™rast£) and finally the Form 
of beauty is identified as ‘the most evident and the most loved’ (250d7-8 
™kfanšstaton... kaˆ ™rasmiètaton). The ‘lover of wisdom’ is thus revealed as a 
manic lover of true Beauty, which is in turn characterised as his ‘most lovable’ 
beloved. This erotic scenario71 while unusual is nevertheless consonant with the 
portrayal of intellectual contact with the Forms in other dialogues. As Price 
observes (1989, 36-8 and 50-4), erotic vocabulary is similarly used at Symposium 
212a; Phaedo 79d; Timaeus 90b-d; Laws 904d6; and Republic 490b.72 Contact 
with truth therefore becomes a form of union with a beloved, where the telos of 
union is achieved through the lover’s intimate knowledge of, and emotional 
engagement with, the object of his desire.73
In presenting the Form of Beauty as ‘shining’ Plato uses the motif of the 
radiance of love familiar in lyric poetry. The sparkling or gleaming appearance of 
lover and beloved is used by both Sappho and Anacreon. In Sappho 16.18 the 
lover remembers ‘the bright sparkle’ of Anactoria’s face (k¢m£rucma l£mpron... 
‡dhn prosèpw) and in 96.8-10 the beauty of a girl is compared to the moon 
                                                 
71 Nussbaum (1986), 217-20 discusses the erotic quality of this and later passages of the myth. On 
the link between sexual and intellectual desire here, see also Lebeck (1972), 273 and Foley (1998), 
58. 
72 On this sexual and procreative imagery, see Pender (1992). 
73 For discussions on the complex relationship between the lovers and the Forms, see Price (1981) 
and (1989), chs. 2 and 3; Vlastos (1981); and Kahn (1987).  
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shedding its light (¢ brodod£ktuloj sel£nna / p£nta perršcois' ¥stra: f£oj 
d' ™p…-/scei), with 34 offering a similar comparison of a girl to the ‘lovely’ 
shining moon (k£lan sel£nnan / ... Ôppota pl»qoisa m£lista l£mpV / 
g©n).74 Closely associated with the beauty of the beloved as shining light is a 
more general connection between love and brightness to express the joy that can 
attend the experience. Sappho interlaces love, beauty and brightness when she 
declares in 58.25-7: ka… moi / tÕ l£[mpron œroj tçel…w kaˆ tÕ k£]lon / 
lš[l]ogce (‘love has obtained for me the brightness and beauty of the sun’, tr. 
Campbell). Anacreon also uses this motif in his fragmentary but still striking lines 
(444): pÒqJ st…lbwn... / geganwmšnoj (‘glistening with desire... gleaming’).75 As 
de Vries and Rowe have noted (ad loc.) Plato at 234d3 seems to be punning on 
Phaedrus’ name (faidrÒj, ‘bright, beaming’) through the use of the poetic verb 
g£nusqai for the glowing appearance of the excited speech-lover.76 This, I would 
suggest, is a direct allusion to Anacreon’s line, and I find support in the further 
parallel of the unusual term st…lbon at 250d2. The poetic adjective77 serves to 
align the ‘shining’ Phaedrus with the glistening quality of the Form of Beauty, 
since in that which ‘glistens’ here at 250d2 is revealed the true source of the 
‘gleaming’ at 234d3. The lyric echoes are momentary but highly effective. The 
account of recollection at 248e5-250e1 as a love story is thus supported by motifs 
familiar from lyric poetry: the wings of eros; contact with divinity; love as 
madness; and the radiance of the beloved.  
The second approach I would like to take to Plato’s presentation of 
recollection is to show how the account is influenced by Sappho’s insights on the 
power of memory to transform the lover’s experience. This second episode of the 
myth in which the soul regains its wings balances the previous one where the soul 
lost its wings. Through journeying upwards again through the exercise of reason 
the soul of the philosopher is presented as a lover remembering his true beloved. 
In this way the lover’s attention is redirected from earthly incarnations of beauty 
(such as a beautiful boy) to the actual source of beauty itself. Recollection 
therefore becomes an erotic pursuit and success is conveyed in various terms 
suggesting happiness and wholeness. In the earlier story of the extracelestial 
procession (248b-c) the souls that are maimed through the incompetent driving of 
their charioteer depart from the vision ¢tele‹j (248b4), i.e. unfulfilled, their 
purpose not accomplished. Any soul able to maintain the vision would remain 
¢p»mona (‘unharmed, free from sorrow’) but failure results in ‘forgetfulness’ (c7 
l»qhj) and the attendant fall to earth (c8). Conversely, here in episode two where 
the souls are able to ‘remember’ the Forms (249c5-7 mn»mV, Øpomn»masin), the 
process of recollection is spoken of as initiation rites through which the 
                                                 
74 The more fragmentary poem 4 also uses shining within what seems to be a description of a 
beloved’s face (¢ntil£mphn... prÒswpon). 
75 Although not certain, the association between beauty, love and brightness would also seem to be 
at work in Anacreon 380 (ca‹re f…lon fîj car…enti meidiîn prosèpJ) and 451 (¼lie 
kallilampšth). 
76 Nussbaum (1986), 229 explains the pun and regards it as extended through the formulation DiÕj 
d‹Òn at 252e, which she reads as a hidden allusion to Plato’s own beloved, since: ‘the name 
“Phaidros” has the same meaning as the name “Dion”. Both mean “brilliant” or “sparkling.”’ 
77 See e.g. Iliad 3.392, where it is used of Paris: k£lleŽ... st…lbwn. 
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philosopher becomes ‘perfect, complete’. The repetition of the key term is striking 
(249c7-8): telšouj ¢eˆ telet¦j teloÚmenoj, tšleoj Ôntwj mÒnoj g…gnetai. 
Recollection therefore is a completing of the soul’s purpose which allows it to be 
‘fulfilled’. The eagerness of the souls in heaven to view the Forms (249d6-7 ¹ 
poll¾ spoud») is mirrored in the incarnate soul’s ‘eagerness to fly upwards’ 
(249d6-7 ¢napteroÚmenoj proqumoÚmenoj ¢naptšsqai). At 250b6 the original 
vision is further characterised as ‘blessed’ (makar…an) and the souls able to view 
the Forms as a ‘happy company’ (eÙda…moni corù). This is the bliss that the 
incarnate soul has lost and the regaining of it is duly termed a ‘most blessed’ 
initiation (250b8-c1): ™teloànto tîn teletîn ¿n qšmij lšgein makariwt£thn. 
Being ‘initiated’ into this rite makes the souls ‘whole’ (250c1 ÐlÒklhroi). In this 
vision of wholeness and completion, the loss and regaining of the wings functions 
also as an image of the soul’s loss and regaining of happiness and fulfilment.  
Read in this way the love story of Phaedrus follows the deficiency model of 
love, as set out in Symposium, whereby what drives the desires of soul is lack.78 
Socrates explains (Symposium 200a):  
Don’t you think that any case of desire is necessarily desire for something which 
is lacking? If it isn’t lacking, you can’t desire it, surely? (tr. Waterfield) 
The lover of beauty becomes aware of the lack of true beauty in the earthly 
likenesses (250b3) and is thus stimulated into seeking the Form through active 
memory. In this way memory provides for the soul a powerful means of 
overcoming its loss, especially since recollection becomes itself the actual 
journey back to the beloved in the divine realm and thus offers a reunion. In 
intellectual terms such reunion can be understood as sustained contact and 
closeness with the standards of truth. By this means indeed the absent beloved, the 
Form of Beauty and the other Forms, actually becomes present again to the lover, 
the philosopher striving to remember truth. On this reading the myth echoes the 
speech of Aristophanes in Symposium as a ‘plea for a return, through Eros, to an 
original unity’ (Calame 1999, 183).79
Both duBois and Foley have maintained that Sappho is an influence on Plato’s 
account of love and memory. I support this claim since the narrative of incarnation 
in Phaedrus follows the structure of the love stories in Sappho. But what is less 
clear is the relationship one can therefore posit between the accounts of the 
philosopher and the poet. As will become clear in this discussion, my own reading 
remains distinct from those of both critics. The central importance of memory in 
Sappho’s thoughts on desire is well established. Anne Burnett presented the case 
persuasively in her influential readings of Sappho in 1979 and 1983.80 
                                                 
78 Price (1989), 12 finds this idea as early as the Lysis (221d7-e3): ‘Desire presupposes need, and 
the origin of need is loss.’ See also his comments on Symp. 200a (1989, 18-21). 
79 Plato’s account of a return to wholeness through memory is paralleled in Freud’s work. See 
Price (1990), esp. 255-7. Relevant texts include ‘Remembering, repeating and working-through’ 
and ‘Moses and monotheism’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (London 1953-74), 12:147-56 and 23:7-137 (esp. 66-124), 
respectively. On the latter work, Caruth (1996), 13 observes the insistent focus on ‘the return to 
origins in memory’.  
80 Burnett (1979), 16-27; and (1983), 277-313, Part Three: Sappho, section iii ‘Memory’. 
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Commenting particularly on the three memory poems (16, 94 and 96), Burnett 
elucidated Sappho’s insights on how the distress of love can be assuaged through 
the activity of memory. For Sappho love is a ritual devoted to the goddess 
Aphrodite and the erotic experience can allow the human lover contact with the 
divine (1983, 277): 
Desire is Aphrodite’s gift, and so is its fulfilment, which means that love 
achieved is like an initiation that brings momentary contact with a divine 
principle. 
For Sappho, Aphrodite if ‘rightly approached’ (277): 
will offer an antidote to the sharp brevity of sensual experience, and to Sappho at 
least this mysterious and enduring benefaction comes in the form of memory—a 
disciplined memory that renders the transience of beauty incorruptible. 
For Burnett Sapphic memory is an ‘organising and classifying’ process (299-300) 
which demands rigour and self-control. Indeed, Sappho’s poetry instructs the 
lovers in how to understand their experience (313): 
the lesson is that tangible beauty is to be desired because it is an aspect of a 
perfect and unattainable beauty that is known only through memory, yet present 
always in the worship of Aphrodite.  
Gentili follows this approach when he observes that in Sappho the lovers’ memory 
(1988, 84): 
reactualizes shared experiences in a paradigmatic fashion and offers assurance 
that the life lived together exists as an absolute reality beyond space and time. 
DuBois (1995) and Foley (1998) build upon these accounts of Sapphic 
memory and further suggest that this aspect of Sappho’s poetry was an important 
influence on Plato’s account of recollection. DuBois and Foley share important 
common ground: both observe the close relationship between desire and lack in 
both Sappho and Plato;81 recognise that Sappho shares with Plato a vision 
whereby yearning for what is absent can be transmuted by the consolations of 
remembering;82 regard Sappho’s poetry as ‘proto-philosophical’ through its 
concern with abstractions;83 note the mockery of the poetic tradition evidenced in 
Socrates’ ‘vessel image’ at 235c-d;84 and, most importantly, explore how the 
naming of Sappho at 235c relates to the allusion to Sapphic poetry within the text. 
                                                 
81 DuBois (1995), 9-10, 29, 33; Foley (1998), 56. See also Snyder on Sappho (1997), 45-6: 
‘Whether the absence is impending..., permanent..., or temporary..., lack of the beloved is an 
inevitable component of desire. Recollection, constructed in the present moment of lack, makes 
acute the awareness of what is gone, thereby heightening the sense of desire for the absent 
beloved.’ 
82 DuBois (1995), 29, 104, 140-4; Foley (1998), 54-6 
83 DuBois (1995), 114; Foley (1998), 58. Calame (2005), 62-6. discusses Sappho’s use of beauty 
and memory in her portrayals of love, noting (64) that Anactoria’s beauty (in poem 16) ‘has a 
Platonic flavor even if the path down which Sappho’s poem leads us is exactly the inverse of that 
which Diotima lays out for us in the Symposium’. Like Foley, he also in this book cites Gentili and 
Burnett on Sapphic memory (2005, 64 n.21) and, like duBois, discusses Sappho’s abstract 
meanings and strategies of argument (2005, 66-9). 
84 DuBois (1995), 85-6; Foley (1998), 42, 44. Both are quoted above in §3, ‘The naming’, n.33.  
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The two critics diverge, however, on the actual nature of the relationship and my 
own position on Plato’s transformation of Sappho coheres in part with both 
readings while not fully agreeing with either one.  
In her 1985 treatment duBois links the mention of Sappho’s name at 235c 
with the subsequent allusion to poem 31 at 251a (1985, 99-100):  
[Socrates’] mention of the poets Sappho and Anacreon (235c) prepares the way 
for a later assumption of her lyric voice. [251b]... Sappho’s was perhaps the 
canonical description of desire, with its brilliant evocation of heat, cold, 
trembling. To echo her response so deftly is to be possessed by her, to become 
the lyric poet possessed by the lyric poetess. 
However, by the 1995 discussion duBois has re-considered and now berates 
Sappho’s ‘expulsion and exclusion from the scene of philosophy’ at Plato’s hands 
(1995, 79). She now regards the naming of Sappho at 235c and the use of Sapphic 
material in the text as a means of denying Sapphic views (87):  
Plato echoes and appropriates the female position, and then uses the occasion to 
deny the body and to sublimate erotic desire into philosophy.  
On this view Plato’s quest for universal, abstract truth stands in stark conflict with 
Sappho’s concerns with ‘specificity’ and ‘materiality’ (1995, 87) and thus their 
approaches to memory differ (1995, 81): 
The woman poet and the man philosopher share the writerly project of recreating 
the beloved, of marking through writing the absence of the loved one... But Plato 
aspires to a denial of corporeal desire, and seeks to sublimate it into another 
memory, that sight of the ideas that keeps men hunting for truth and beauty, that 
prevents them from being trapped in the tomb of the body, while Sappho only 
wants more of the body, only regrets being denied it through absence and 
distance... She exhibits no desire to transcend the body, no desire to escape from 
flesh.  
For duBois their difference in outlook leads to Plato ultimately silencing the poet 
(1995, 87-8): 
The two renderings of desire differ radically. In Plato’s hands the Sapphic model 
is appropriated and then disembodied, amputated. Sappho cannot remain in the 
philosophical text; even the disembodied Sappho, invoked allusively, like other 
women is exorcised from the Platonic dialogue. If the woman can be 
subordinated, dominated, and incorporated into the Platonic project of 
transcendence of corporeality, she may be represented, present, but silent. 
On the 1985 reading Plato is ‘possessed’ by Sappho and ‘echoes her response’; yet 
on the 1995 reading Plato is ‘silencing’ the poetess. While it is easy to dismiss the 
1995 view of the ‘amputation’ of Sappho as unnecessarily extreme, it nevertheless 
has the merit of allowing a consistent negativity to emerge from Phaedrus on the 
lack of knowledge displayed by the poets. The difficulty, however, comes in 
explaining why Plato then uses Sapphic motifs to the extent that he does.  
Foley is, like duBois, alert to the allusions to Sappho in Phaedrus but reaches 
a different conclusion on them. Foley regards Sappho as serving ‘in some critical 
respects’ as the inspiration for Socrates’ argument in his second speech on love 
(1998, 40-1), through her account of memory within erotic relations (54-68). 
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Foley draws usefully on evidence from Maximus of Tyre, who speaks of Sappho 
as the ‘mother’ of Socrates’ argument, to show that this view of Sappho’s 
influence on Plato was already held in antiquity.85 She rejects the view of duBois, 
and other recent commentators on Sappho, that Sappho’s poetry celebrates 
corporeality (55-7) and instead sees a closer relationship between the erotics of 
Plato and Sappho. For Foley what allows Plato to transform rather than silence 
Sappho is a shared outlook on love. While she accepts (62) that ‘Sapphic 
generalization does not deliberately anticipate the Platonic abstraction of the 
incorporeal from the corporeal’, she nevertheless maintains that ‘it takes a step in 
that direction by moving the listener beyond beauty in the visual world to beauty 
in the world of the imagination and to potential poetic permanence’. She therefore 
concludes (68): 
for both Plato and Sappho erotics involves far more than the body. The erotic 
discourses of Plato and Sappho can lead their interlocutors beyond the specific 
to the paradigmatic, and beyond bodily pleasure and possessing in Sappho to 
memory, song, and religious festivity and in Plato to a pursuit of philosophical 
knowledge and truth where memory (anamnesis) and beauty play a catalytic 
role.86  
I agree with Foley that Plato echoes Sappho’s account of desire, loss and the 
transformative power of memory. For in the myth of the soul the underlying 
narrative of incarnation follows the structure of the love stories in Sappho: lover 
departs unwillingly from beloved but through the power of memory can achieve 
reunion and satisfy desire. But I think that duBois’ emphasis on a significant gap 
between Sappho and Plato is still worth upholding, since the actual type of 
‘paradigmatic’ experience of the lovers in each case remains fundamentally 
different. Foley reduces the distance between poet and philosopher by noting a 
shared approach to erotics that goes far beyond bodily experience. This is a 
worthwhile observation but it needs to be balanced with a much fuller account of 
the serious divisions that remain between the two—for example, in the type of 
‘permanence’ each is concerned with, in the level of effort and discipline 
demanded and, most of all, in the consequences of failure. However, against 
duBois’ view that Plato ‘exorcises’ and ‘silences’ Sappho, I agree with Foley and 
others87 that Plato’s appropriation of Sapphic memory represents rather a 
transformation in line with his psychology and metaphysics.  
                                                 
85 Maximus of Tyre uses the phrase the ‘mother of the logos’ in his essay on Socratic Love, in 
which he argues that Socrates’ erotic logoi were not original to him but far older (Oration 18.7): 
‘But whether the mother of the theory [¹ toà lÒgou m»thr] was a Mantinean or a Lesbian, it is at 
any rate quite clear that Socrates’ discussions of Love are not unique to him [oÙk ‡dioi] and do not 
begin with him either [oÙd prètou]’ (tr. Trapp, 1997, 165-6). 
86 Foley also advances the thesis that Plato adopts from Sappho a ‘less hierarchical and more 
reciprocal mode of homoerotic relations’. But the evidence from lyric poetry in general seems to 
present no consistent hierarchical model, as Ferrari has noted (1987, 107-8). Foley also suggests 
that Sappho’s use of dialogue may have influenced Plato but this too seems unconvincing. First, 
the influence of Socrates in this respect would seem to preclude the need to look for any further 
models; and secondly, the case is diluted by the fact that other lyric poets (for example, 
Archilochus and Theognis) make similar use of dialogue. On this technique in Archilochus, with 
notes on Theognis, see Burnett (1983), 68-72. 
87 See e.g. Nightingale (1995), 158-62, esp. 159 n.53. 
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In this current episode the myth has introduced the soul of the philosopher as 
a lover and the Form of Beauty as its beloved. This revelation of shining Beauty 
creates the basis for the two final episodes, since both take up the story of the 
lover’s reaction to the Form. The soul’s responses to Beauty are now viewed 
through two different lenses: first the changes in the nature of the soul’s wings 
(episode three) and second the contrasting behaviours of the soul’s horses and 
charioteer (episode four). Although the next two episodes are successive in the 
text, they describe the lover’s simultaneous reactions to the sight of Beauty.  
5.3 Regrowth (250e1-253c6) 
In the final two episodes of the myth the narrative turns from the nature of 
Beauty itself to its impact on the human soul. Throughout these episodes a key 
moment is replayed: the soul’s act of seeing beauty. This event is spoken of by 
means of different viewing subjects (the philosopher, the soul, and the charioteer 
and horses of soul) and different objects of vision (the Form of Beauty itself, the 
beautiful boy and his beautiful face) but is consistently portrayed as a lover’s 
visual encounter with the beloved. The eyes of the lover and beloved are the most 
significant points of contact, as Plato again follows an established tradition of love 
lyric. As Calame explains (1999, 20), the ‘favorite medium’ of Eros is the gaze, 
which ‘operates as a vector of amorous feeling’.88 But Plato reshapes the tradition 
to allow the eyes to serve also as the conduit between the non-physical Form of 
beauty and the lovers’ very soul. Both episodes are structured around the sightings 
of beauty since this is the critical moment when beauty and love exert their 
maximum power on the lover. The two episodes are closely integrated in that each 
maintains a dual perspective on the external experiences of the lover and the 
internal experiences of his soul. But the emphasis differs: episode three on the 
regrowth of soul’s wings looks more at the impact of beauty on the soul, while 
episode four on control focuses more on the reactions within the soul. In both 
episodes Plato continues to draw on the motifs and vocabulary of lyric poetry and 
in episode three, as the actual impact of beauty is analysed, the clearest of all his 
allusions to Sappho can be heard.  
Episode three opens with the contrast between the viewing experience of the 
non-philosophical man (250e1-251a1) as against that of the newly-initiated and 
hence philosophical man (251a1-253c6). When the non-philosophical man (m¾ 
neotel»j) sees beauty (250e3 qeèmenoj), his lack of reaction is set out in four 
negatives: he does not get transported (oÙk... fšretai) to the Forms; he does not 
revere the sight (oÙ sšbetai); and he does not fear or feel ashamed before it (oÙ 
dšdoiken oÙd' a„scÚnetai). In direct contrast when the recent initiate 
(¢rtitel»j) sees beauty (251a3 ‡dV), he undergoes a series of changes described 
as applying first to his whole self and then to his soul. First he is afraid, ‘he 
shudders and experiences something of the fears he had before’ (251a4 œfrixe... 
                                                 
88 See Calame (1999), 20-2, on the association between Eros and the gaze in various Greek poets. 
Plato again follows this tradition in his use of the phrase „dën tÕ ™rwtikÕn Ômma (‘catching sight 
of the eye/light of his love’) at 253e5. 
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deim£twn).89 The verb fr…ssw denotes the sensation experienced in 
‘goosebumps’—i.e. both the effect of cold (‘to shiver’) and the effect of fear (‘to 
shudder’). Then there is a sudden and extreme change (metabol») as the chill 
gives way to a fever (251a7-b1): 
„dÒnta d' aÙtÕn oŒon ™k tÁj fr…khj metabol» te kaˆ ƒdrëj kaˆ qermÒthj 
¢»qhj lamb£nei: 
After he has seen him, the expected change comes over him following the 
shuddering—sweating and a high fever. (tr. Rowe) 
This passage constitutes the strongest verbal allusion to Sappho in Phaedrus. For 
the dramatic situation of the sighting of the beloved and the internal reactions 
triggered closely echo Sappho’s famous poem 31, as critics have noted. DuBois’ 
discussion (1995, 66, 85-7) speaks of the ‘remarkable similarities between 
descriptions of erotic suffering in Plato’s prose and Sappho’s verse’. DuBois 
rightly notes four points of correspondence between 251a-b and Sappho 31: 
trembling; cold sweat; the gaze; and the ‘flame beneath the flesh’ (1985, 100). 
Ferrari observes that the experience of Plato’s lover ‘has been compared to that of 
the feverish lover who speaks Sappho’s famous poem’ (1987, 153-4) and that the 
comparison is ‘more readily made’ because of the naming of Sappho and 
Anacreon at 235c (154).90 Price notes the parallel in passing (1989, 36), and 
Nightingale in her more extended treatment sees this poem as the ‘most obvious 
incursion’ of lyric into Phaedrus (1995, 158). I accept Nightingale’s judgement 
that this allusion is ‘just the beginning’, since Plato’s narrative of lover and 
beloved is indeed ‘replete with the discourse of lyric love poetry’ (158). Foley 
(1998, 46) discusses the allusion briefly and adds that Plato’s audience was likely 
to have been alert to the ‘initial similarity’ between the two texts. I would like to 
explore more fully how Plato uses and transforms Sappho’s poetic vision of eros. 
First, this particular allusion is interwoven with many others, as Plato creates in 
this episode an exuberant and thrilling depiction which in its language and pace is 
as delirious as the soul it portrays. Second, using elements from this poetic vision 
of eros, particularly the image of streams, Plato reframes its very notions of 
contact with divinity and divine possession. In both of these ways Plato responds 
to Sappho’s depiction of the lover in poem 31 by considering what follows the 
initial impact caused by the sighting of beauty. 
In his extraordinary depiction of the lover’s soul at 251a-252a Plato draws 
freely on lyric motifs for the erotic experience. Images and ideas familiar from 
lyric proliferate and in the speed and excitement of the passage various motifs are 
run together. These include: the metabole between pleasure and pain; fear, melting 
and madness. When the philosophical man sees beauty, the sighting sets in motion 
                                                 
89 This love effect is experienced only by a soul that has recently viewed the Forms or is not 
corrupted (250e-251a). The reference to tÒte (before) is to the soul’s existence before incarnation 
and its viewing of the Forms. 
90 When Ferrari (1987), 154 n.19 notes on this allusion ‘as seen by Fortenbaugh 1966’, he is 
confused, since Fortenbaugh is concerned only with Sapphic influence on Socrates’ first speech. 
But the allusion had indeed been seen by duBois in 1985. For Ferrari the main significance of the 
comparison lies in Plato’s displacement of the symptoms of the lover from body to soul. 
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a series of reactions. The metabole91 at 251a-b from chill to fever recalls Sappho’s 
stricken lover in 31, but the sudden shift in temperature also echoes Sappho 48 
with its image of the beloved who is able through her presence alone to ‘cool’ 
(œyuxaj) the ‘burning’ (kaiomšnan) of desire. The same sudden shift from hot to 
cold appears in Anacreon’s forged metal image in poem 413.92 The ‘trembling’ 
and ‘fears’ of 251a recall Ibycus 287 where the narrator ‘fears the onset’ of Love 
(tromšw nin ™percÒmenon) and indeed the general apprehension at the approach 
of Love that can be heard elsewhere in lyric, as discussed above. The poetic 
depiction of metabole continues as the experience of regrowing wings causes 
sudden shifts between pleasure and pain.  
The dominant image in this section of the narrative is the stream of beauty. 
Plato builds upon the notion of erotic heat familiar in Sappho and lyric by 
identifying an actual source for the shift in temperature. For the change comes 
from the entry of the stream of beauty flowing into the lover’s soul through his 
eyes (251b1-2): 
dex£menoj g¦r toà k£llouj t¾n ¢porro¾n di¦ tîn Ñmm£twn ™qerm£nqh
93  
he is warmed by the reception of the effluence of beauty through his eyes. (tr. 
Rowe) 
This warming stream of beauty causes parts of the soul to melt (251b3 
qermanqšntoj d ™t£kh), an erotic motif familiar in lyric. Anacreon 459 speaks 
of ‘melting Love’ (takerÕj d' ”Erwj), while Ibycus locates the source of the 
effect in the gaze of Love (287.1-2): 
”Eroj aâtš me kuanšoisin ØpÕ / blef£roij takšr' Ômmasi derkÒmenoj 
Again Love, looking at me meltingly from under his dark eyelids. (tr. Campbell) 
The motif is also used by Ibycus at 282c (fr. 29.3-5) for Eros’ own desire: 
p£]mpan ¢nec[r…sq]h
94
 taker©i fren[ˆ / mat]rÕj ™pist[a]mšnaj p£[r]a dîro[n 
™-/f…m]eron: 
he... had his melting heart completely tinged [coloured/pricked] by his skilled 
mother with her gift of desire. (tr. Campbell) 
While the warming stream of beauty at 251b might suggest a pleasant warming, 
the change in state within the soul also clearly involves irritation and discomfort 
(251c1-5). Further verbs also reinforcing the image of water serve unequivocally 
to convey disruption: the whole soul ‘boils’ (251c1, c4 ze‹) and ‘gushes forth, 
                                                 
91 Compare the experience of the lover in Socrates’ first speech at 241a2 and 241b5: metabalèn. 
92 Anacreon’s image of forging red-hot metal is used by Plato at Republic 387c and 411a-b (see 
Naddaff (2002), 44 and 105 on the motif of melting iron). Calame (1999), 20 notes a similar image 
at Pindar fr. 123: ‘has a black heart forged of adamant or iron / in an icy flame.’  
93 See also 251c8 qerma…nhtai and 253e6 diaqerm»naj t¾n yuc»n.  
94 The verb ¢nacr…w is a compound of cr…w which means ‘to touch on the surface’, ‘to anoint’, ‘to 
rub over with colour’ but also ‘to wound on the surface, prick, sting’ (LSJ). The latter sense is 
consonant with the irritation of love expressed elsewhere by Ibycus in terms of ‘biting’ and 
‘stinging’: 282a fr. 4 (S169): dakequm[...].aj paidîn; and 282c fr. 1 col. ii: maino[...]d©gma. The 
root verb cr…w is used in a similar erotic context at Ibycus 282c fr. 1 col. i.10, where Charis is 
nurturing, flattering and bestowing beauty on a beloved boy.  
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bubbles up’ (251c1 ¢nakhk…ei). Here Plato’s lover ‘boils’ in the beloved’s 
presence but at 251c8-d1 it is paradoxically this boiling and irritation that is said 
to relieve the soul, as it experiences relief from its anguish (ÑdÚnhj) and is filled 
with joy (gšghqen). The changes of state are rapid as this joy is immediately 
contrasted with the distress caused correspondingly by the beloved’s absence 
(251d1): when separated the soul ‘becomes parched’ (aÙcm»sV) while parts of it 
‘throb’ (phdîsa) ‘like pulsing arteries’ and ‘prick’ (™gcr…ei) the surface. The 
result of this inner tumult is that (251d5-6):  
p©sa kentoumšnh kÚklJ ¹ yuc¾ o„str´ kaˆ Ñdun©tai 
the entire soul, stung all over, goes mad with pain. (tr. Rowe) 
The pain of separation imaged here as ‘being parched’ (aÙcm»sV) recalls the 
‘parching madness’ (¢zalšaij man…aisin) of Ibycus 286, where the adverse 
effects of love are felt as the blasts of a lightning storm. The painful irritations of 
love also echo Ibycus’ verse: where Plato speaks of the sharpness of ‘stings and 
goads’ (251d5 kentoumšnh; 251e4 kšntrwn; 254a1 kšntrwn), Ibycus used terms 
of ‘biting’ and ‘stinging’. Plato’s ™gcr…ei (251d5, ‘pricking’) used for the surface 
of the soul is the same root verb that Ibycus employs for the surface of Eros’ own 
heart at 282c. The next metabole, back to joy, is achieved through the lover’s 
memory of the absent beloved’s beauty (mn»mhn d' aâ œcousa toà kaloà 
gšghqen). Plato follows the lyric poets in linking these sudden shifts with madness 
and confusion, as the soul in turmoil tries to make sense of its confusing and 
contradictory experiences (251d7-8): 
™k d ¢mfotšrwn memeigmšnwn ¢dhmone‹ te tÍ ¢top…v toà p£qouj kaˆ 
¢poroàsa lutt´, kaˆ ™mman¾j oâsa...  
The mixture of both these states makes it despair at the strangeness of its 
condition, raging in its perplexity, and in its madness... (tr. Rowe) 
The soul’s madness makes it unable to settle and its longing now causes it to ‘run’ 
(qe‹ d poqoàsa) in pursuit of ‘the possessor of beauty’ (251e2-3). The disturbed 
state and indeed panic of the soul is mirrored in the rapid narrative with its build-
up of subordinate clauses.95 The headlong pursuit brings another sighting of the 
beloved which allows the lover’s soul again to ‘channel desire’ into itself through 
the stream of beauty: „doàsa de kaˆ ™poceteusamšnh †meron. This welcome 
sight brings not only relief but also pleasure (251e3-252a1):  
it releases what was pent up before, and finding a breathing space (¢napno¾n) it 
ceases from its stinging birth-pains (kšntrwn te kaˆ çd…nwn œlhxen), once 
more enjoying this for the moment as the sweetest pleasure (¹don¾n d' aâ 
taÚthn glukut£thn... karpoàtai). (tr. Rowe) 
The superlative glukut£thn (251e5) amidst the sudden swings between pleasure 
and pain seems designed to recall Sappho’s depiction of eros as glukÚpikron 
                                                 
95 The account of the intense inner experience of eros which covers 37 lines of text—from 251a7 
(metabol») to 252b1—is divided into merely five full sentences.  
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(130).96 Plato thus echoes the lyric poets’ portrayals of the bittersweet and 
bewildering nature of the erotic experience.97  
The image of the stream of beauty is central to Plato’s depiction of the soul in 
love. Beauty is linked directly with the regaining of the soul’s wings since it is by 
this stream that the plumage of the lover’s soul is ‘watered’ (251b2-3 Î ¹ toà 
pteroà fÚsij ¥rdetai) and thus able to ‘regrow’. The language of natural 
growth is used as the feathers of the soul’s wings are spoken of as plants shooting 
up from their roots (251b5-6 blast£nein; ¢pÕ tÁj ·…zhj). Lebeck and others 
have explained very well the interaction of plant and other physiological imagery 
in this rich depiction of the inner soul.98 The stream image provides a distinct 
image for the perception of beauty.99 Earlier in the myth at 250b5-6 another mode 
of perception was used as the Form of beauty was presented as a shining light, a 
motif familiar from the poets. In considering the impact of lyric on the passage at 
251a-252a, it is worth asking whether the poets provide any presentation of 
beauty as a stream or water, and there is evidence that they do. Sappho 96 presents 
an image of beauty as moonlight but as the poem goes on the image changes so 
that the moon provides water for the earth (6-14): 
nàn d LÚdaisin ™mpršpetai guna…-  
kessin êj pot' ¢el…w  
dÚntoj ¢ brodod£ktuloj sel£nna  
p£nta perršcois' ¥stra: f£oj d' ™p…- 
scei q£lassan ™p' ¢lmÚran  
‡swj kaˆ poluanqšmoij ¢roÚraij:  
¢ d' ™šrsa k£la kšcutai, teq£-  
laisi d brÒda k¥pal' ¥n-  
qruska kaˆ mel…lwtoj ¢nqemèdhj: 
Now she stands out among Lydian women like the rosy-fingered moon after 
sunset, surpassing all the stars, and its light spreads alike over the salt sea and 
the flowery fields; the dew is shed in beauty, and roses bloom and tender chervil 
and flowery melilot. (tr. Campbell) 
The moonlight thus sends dew ‘which is shed in beauty’ (12 k£la kšcutai), and 
this in turn allows the flowers to bloom (12-14). Burnett comments on this poem 
(1983, 307):  
                                                 
96 The influence of Sappho’s famous compound is evident in other love lyrics, notably Theognis 
1353-6: pikrÕj kaˆ glukÚj ™sti kaˆ ¡rpalšoj kaˆ ¢phn»j, / Ôfra tšleioj œV, KÚrne, 
nšoisin œrwj. / Àn g£r tij telšsV, glukÝ g…netai: Àn d dièkwn m¾ telšsV, p£ntwn toàt' 
¢nihrÒtaton. 
97 DuBois (1995), 87 discusses the alternating experiences of the soul in this passage. See also 
Calame (1999), 188-9. Ferrari (1987), 107 n.25 compares Plato’s idea that the beloved can cure the 
lover’s sickness (252b1 „atrÕn... pÒnwn) with the alleviation of suffering in Sappho 31. 
98 Lebeck (1972), esp. 273-5. Further, Lebeck (1972), 273, Nussbaum (1986), 217, Ferrari (1987), 
154-7 and Nightingale (1995), 160 are all alert to the sexual connotations of various aspects of the 
plant images. Note also that in lyric the beloved’s beauty is often conveyed through the beauty of 
the natural world: Sappho fr. 94, 96 and 132; Archilochus 25; Anacreon 414.  
99 Empedoclean theory of vision is active in this image of the stream. Although my concern is with 
lyric, the text is to be located within a broader critical framework of not only philosophical poetry 
but also, for example, epic and epinician, as well as a whole host of prose genres.  
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This moon of absent beauty, as Sappho presents it, reaches the earth (and Atthis) 
in two forms—first with its spreading and general light, and secondly with its 
dripping and tangible dew.  
Thus in poem 96, as at Phaedrus 251b, beauty stimulates natural growth and in 
both there is a direct interaction between images of light, water and vegetation.100 
Further, in Sappho 112 love itself is also imaged as a stream ‘poured’ over the 
lover’s face (œroj d' ™p' „mšrtJ kšcutai prosèpJ), an image which will 
resonate in the next section of the myth as Plato addresses the concept of divine 
possession. 
The final sighting of beauty in this episode of the regrowth of wings is the 
‘intense’ gazing on the ‘god’ which is the philosophical lovers’ determined act of 
recollection (253a2). Here Plato reframes the poetic notion of divine possession 
where the erotic experience is regarded as establishing a direct contact between 
the earthly lover and the gods, Aphrodite and Eros. As the non-philosophical man 
remains unmoved at the sight of beauty (250e), one of the negatives used for his 
non-reaction is that he does not ‘revere it as he looks upon it’ (oÙ sšbetai 
prosorîn). In contrast the newly-initiated philosopher in his lover’s madness 
‘pays reverence to the possessor of beauty’ (252a7-b1 sšbesqai tÕn tÕ k£lloj 
œconta). The language of religious veneration is developed in a rich passage at 
252c-253c where a complex relationship is drawn between lover, beloved and the 
gods of the extracelestial procession. The key idea of this passage is that the erotic 
experience furnishes the lover and the beloved with a means of establishing direct 
contact with divinity, an idea that develops the earlier language of viewing the 
Forms as a religious initiation (249c-d; 250b-d). At 249d Socrates presented two 
competing terms for the lover’s arousal at the sight of beauty: parakinîn (‘being 
disturbed’) and ™nqousi£zwn (‘being possessed’). This religious language is now 
employed to show how the lover is ‘possessed’ by both the Form of beauty and 
the gods in heaven, in the sense that both types of divinity become actually 
present inside his soul. The passage seems to explore what it means to say that a 
person is ‘possessed’ by divinity and two types of ‘possession’ seem to be offered. 
The Forms are static entities but in the presence of beauty a ‘stream’ is created 
that passes from the Form of Beauty through the appearance of the beautiful boy 
and then directly (through his eyes) into the lover’s soul. In this way the lover 
now has inside himself the divinity of the Form in a medium that is active and 
actively changes him (the moving stream stimulates the growth of the soul’s 
wings). The implication that by this means the soul itself will share in the beauty 
is supported by Socrates’ prayer to Pan at the end of the dialogue (279b8-9): 
‘grant me that I may become beautiful within.’  
But a second type of ‘possession’ is presented whereby the soul of the lover 
receives into itself the force of the particular active divine soul that he followed in 
the celestial procession. This type of possession consists in the lover’s devotion to 
a specific god and imitation of him. At 252d1-2 the myth tells that ‘each man lives 
after the pattern of the god in whose chorus he was, honouring him by imitating 
                                                 
100 For Nussbaum (1986), 230-3 these images form part of Plato’s positive depiction of the lovers’ 
interdependency and ‘receptivity’.  
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him so far as he can’ (tr. Rowe): kaˆ oÛtw kaq' ›kaston qeÒn, oá ›kastoj Ãn 
coreut»j, ™ke‹non timîn te kaˆ mimoÚmenoj e„j tÕ dunatÕn zÍ.101 Part of this 
honouring and imitation is the seeking out of appropriate associations and so the 
lover chooses as his beloved another from same god’s heavenly ‘chorus’. Once he 
has chosen a suitable boy, he treats him as a substitute for their original divine 
leader (252d6-e1): 
kaˆ æj qeÕn aÙtÕn ™ke‹non Ônta ˜autù oŒon ¥galma tekta…neta… te kaˆ 
katakosme‹, æj tim»swn te kaˆ Ñrgi£swn. 
And fashions and adorns him like a statue, as if he were himself his god, in order 
to honour him and celebrate his mystic rites. (tr. Rowe)  
Thus the beloved receives religious veneration that is ultimately directed to the 
god himself, in the same way as a statue serves as a substitute for the god’s 
presence.102 But Plato is presenting a more intricate picture in this religious 
language and veneration. For the lover seeks to shape the beloved into being a 
better image of the god through the development of his potential as a philosopher 
(252e1-5). It must be remembered here that the lover is himself already at heart a 
philosopher, as this whole experience is that of the newly initiated (251a). But it 
seems he may have forgotten his philosophical ways until reminded by his recent 
contact with beauty. The text switches to the plural for the philosophers as it 
explains the triangular relationship between the nature of the god in heaven and 
the potentially divine nature of both the philosopher and his beloved. The 
possibility that the philosophers had lapsed from their philosophical activity is 
raised and their path back to divinity set out (252e5-253a5): 
™¦n oân m¾ prÒteron ™mbebîsi tù ™pithdeÚmati, tÒte ™piceir»santej 
manq£nous… te Óqen ¥n ti dÚnwntai kaˆ aÙtoˆ metšrcontai, „cneÚontej d 
par' ˜autîn ¢neur…skein t¾n toà sfetšrou qeoà fÚsin eÙporoàsi di¦ tÕ 
suntÒnwj ºnagk£sqai prÕj tÕn qeÕn blšpein, kaˆ ™faptÒmenoi aÙtoà tÍ 
mn»mV ™nqousiîntej ™x ™ke…nou lamb£nousi t¦ œqh kaˆ t¦ ™pithdeÚmata, 
kaq' Óson dunatÕn qeoà ¢nqrèpJ metasce‹n: 
So if they have not previously set foot on this way, they undertake it now, both 
learning from wherever they can and finding out for themselves; and as they 
follow the scent from within themselves to the discovery of the nature of their 
own god, they find the means to it through the compulsion on them to gaze 
intensely on the god, and grasping him through memory, and possessed by him, 
they take their habits and ways from him, to the extent that it is possible for man 
to share in god. (tr. Rowe) 
The state of ‘possession’ (™nqousiîntej) is thus attributed to the lover’s devotion 
to imitating the divine (253a-b): he models his character and habits on his original 
leader (253a3-4 ™x ™ke…nou lamb£nousi t¦ œqh kaˆ t¦ ™pithdeÚmata), so far 
as it is possible for a man to ‘share in god’ (qeoà... metasce‹n). In this way the 
lover aims to make his own soul more divine. But this goal is also achieved 
through venerating the beloved and seeking to shape his soul in line with their 
                                                 
101 See also mimoÚmenoi 253b5. 
102 Calame (1999), 189 explains: ‘the social and pedagogical relationship between an erômenos... 
and an erastês... is transfigured... By dint of an effort of memory, the loved one becomes for the 
lover a kind of visual representation (agalma) of the god to whom the soul has gained access.’  
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shared divine model (253a-b). The lovers deriving from Zeus’ chorus are likened 
to Bacchants and imagined as ‘drawing’ from their god and ‘pouring the draught 
over the soul of their loved one’ (tr. Rowe): ¢rÚtwsin, ésper aƒ b£kcai, ™pˆ 
t¾n toà ™rwmšnou yuc¾n ™pantloàntej (253a6-7). This ‘pouring’, reminiscent 
of Sappho 96 and 112, seems to represent a transfer of qualities as part of the 
lovers’ attempts to make their beloved ‘as like their god as possible’: æj dunatÕn 
ÐmoiÒtaton tù sfetšrJ qeù (253a7-b1).103 If the beloved does become more 
like their god, then the philosopher through association with him gains another 
route for attaining contact with divinity. The philosophical lovers are able to 
discover the nature of their own god, and what leads them to this discovery is 
‘following the track from within themselves’. This inner track is their own erotic 
longing for truth. For it is the act of being ‘forced’ to ‘gaze on the god’ (which 
seems to refer both to the beloved as transmitter of beauty and to the god of the 
original procession) that leads to the ‘grasping’ of the god ‘through memory’.104 
And what forces this gazing is erotic desire, initially for the boy. This longing for 
contact with the divine is already present within the philosophers but they have 
forgotten it. The sight of beauty thus sparks the memory of the Forms and 
therefore the active reasoning of the philosophers, and it is through the exercise of 
this internal power that the philosophers can in one sense become closer (in 
mythical terms) to the gods they once followed and (in non-mythical terms) to the 
state of full rationality they once enjoyed through intimate knowledge of the 
Forms.105 Thus Plato here reformulates the notion of divine possession: the 
philosophers are ‘possessed’ (™nqousiîntej)106 by their god in the sense that they 
become obsessed with achieving a clearer vision of the divinity they followed in 
procession, which in turn leads them to recognise their own divine origins and 
potential,107 as souls that shared in the vision of the Forms (249c6).  
In this reframing of the concept of contact with divinity under the influence of 
eros, Plato again uses motifs from the lyric discourse on love. The idea that erotic 
experience can bring the lover into contact with the divine is present in lyric 
                                                 
103 Lebeck (1972), 278 observes the parallel within the Phaedrus myth between the lovers as 
Bacchants and the stream of beauty. 
104 The referent of the term ‘god’ here is deliberately ambiguous: it must refer to both the beloved 
boy as the incarnation of beauty and the immortal soul in heaven in whose procession the 
philosophers followed. For it is the sight of beauty in the boy that sparks the erotic longing that 
‘compels’ the lover to go on ‘gazing’ at him. The language of erotic compulsion (ºnagk£sqai) 
continues the theme begun in Lysias’ speech (see e.g. 233b4 ¢nagk£zei). 
105 In the metaphor of the lovers ‘grasping’ their original god (253a2 ™faptÒmenoi), the verb is the 
same as that used elsewhere in the dialogues for making contact with the Forms: Rep. 490b3-4 
(¤yasqai... ™f£ptesqai); Rep. 611e1 (¤ptetai); Symp. 209c2 (¡ptÒmenoj); Symp. 212a4-5 
(™faptomšnJ... ™faptomšnJ); and Soph. 259d6 (™faptomšnou).  
106 Plato’s analysis of possession can be seen as the reanimation of the metaphor enthousiasmos—
literally, ‘having a god within’. Since the stream of beauty is twice identified, via etymologies, as 
‘desire’ itself (251c7 and 255c1-2), Ricoeur’s point (see above, §4), that Plato’s use of false 
etymology features particularly in the context of his reanimation of established metaphors, is again 
borne out. Foley (1998), 44 n.18 explains the etymology: ‘The passage here evokes as well the 
love of Zeus for Ganymede, his cup-bearer and wine-pourer. Beauty emits an effluence called 
himeros (derived from mere + epionta + reonta, ‘particles coming in a flood’, 251c6-7).’  
107 See also 255a1 æj „sÒqeoj and 255b6 tÕn œnqeon f…lon. 
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poetry in various ways. First is the idea of epiphany. In poem 1 Sappho prays to 
Aphrodite to ‘come’ to her (1.25), asking the goddess not just to intervene in her 
situation but actually to come down directly into her own presence. Since Sappho 
is already experiencing Aphrodite through being in love,108 there is a sense in 
which Aphrodite is all too present as it is. But Sappho needs a further direct 
experience with Aphrodite in order to make her attractive to the beloved.109 As 
with the figures of the Graces, the idea at work is that the goddesses who are 
themselves beautiful can through direct contact bestow beauty and elegance on 
their favourites, thus helping in the seductive quest.110 This transfer of beauty 
from the divine to the human figures has similarities with Plato’s transfer of 
beauty from the Form to the beautiful boy and from there into the lover’s soul 
through the moving stream of beauty. A second relevant poetic motif is that the 
beloved’s beauty makes them like the immortals. In Sappho 96.4-5 the beloved is 
‘like a goddess for all to see’ (qšai s' „kšlan ¢rignètai);111 for Stesichorus 
Hermione is ‘like the immortal goddesses’ (S104); and Ibycus tells of a beloved 
who is ‘the most handsome of earth-dwellers, like the immortals in form’ (282a fr. 
1.25-6 k£lliston ™picq[on…wn / ¢qan£t]oij ™nal[…]gkion edo[j). Finally, there 
is the related view that the beloved becomes a divinity in his lover’s eyes. Foley 
(1998, 47 n.32) cites a remark attributed to Anacreon which claims that boys ‘are 
our gods’:112
'Anakršonta goàn ™rwthqšnta, fas…, diat… oÙk e„j qeoÝj ¢ll' e„j pa‹daj 
gr£feij toÝj Ûmnouj; e„pe‹n, Óti oátoi ¹mîn qeo… e„sin. 
They say that when Anacreon was asked why he did not write hymns to gods but 
to boys, he replied, ‘Because they are my [our] gods’. (tr. Campbell) 
The ‘divinity’ of the boys for Anacreon and Plato rests on the feelings of devotion 
and veneration they stir in the lover. For Plato this feeling of veneration is 
appropriate because through eros for the boy the lovers are set on the path of re-
establishing contact with divinity. The lovers achieve this contact by modelling 
their own and their beloveds’ souls on the ‘gods within’ themselves, namely the 
gods they followed and viewed in the extracelestial procession, gods who still 
reside ‘in’ them through their memory of and desire for truth. 
In this episode the soul is shown as able, under the influence of beauty, to 
regain the wings that symbolise its perfection. In order to convey the impact of 
beauty on the philosophical man’s soul Plato reveals the marked changes in its 
nature that follow the sighting of the beloved. In this account Plato uses a wealth 
of images and motifs from lyric poetry, including pleasure and pain, melting, 
madness, sudden shifts in experience, flowing water and organic growth. The final 
                                                 
108 See Sappho 102, where Aphrodite is the active force of desire: pÒqJ d£meisa pa‹doj 
brad…nan di' 'Afrod…tan. 
109 In Iliad 3 the beauty of Paris and Helen is linked with their closeness to Aphrodite (see e.g. 392 
and 415). 
110 See e.g. Sappho 81.3-8; also Ibycus 282c fr. 1. col. i.11-12: tšren d / k£lloj ç]p£san qea….  
111 Similarly, see Calame (2005), 63-4 on Helen as the ‘mythic incarnation’ and Anactoria as the 
‘earthly representative’ of the kalliston (Sappho 16). 
112 Sch. Pindar Isth. 2.1b = Anacreon, test. 7 in Campbell (vol. II, 29). 
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episode tells what happens after this initial impact of beauty and Plato delivers an 
emphatic response to the lyric vision.  
5.4 Self-control (253c7-256e2)  
The final episode of the myth concludes the previous sections of the narrative 
on soul and the previous speeches on love by unifying the themes of the power of 
love and the need for self-control. The episode, in response to Lysias’ speech and 
following on from the ‘inner rulers’ of Socrates’ first speech, provides a new 
understanding of self-control. The central narrative of this episode is the training 
of the bad horse, a process which is Plato’s redefinition of self-control 
(swfrosÚnh). In these culminating scenes of the power-struggle within the 
lover’s soul, the violent terms evoke the earlier description of the carnage in the 
heavenly procession (episode 1, 247b5; 248a4-b4) and the anguish of the soul 
stung and maddened with pain (episode 3, 251d5-6). The threatening image of 
eros portrayed in love poetry is recalled but is also given a distinctly un-poetic 
development. The poetic motif of charioteer and horses113 receives extended 
treatment as it is used to offer new perspectives on the dominating power of eros 
and on the lover’s own powers to respond. It is in this episode that the aspects of 
control implicit in the image of charioteer and horses are explored most fully.  
As in the previous episode sightings of beauty structure the narrative, since 
this key moment is shown as triggering a set of responses in the soul. Whereas 
earlier the soul responded to the influence of beauty through the regrowth of its 
wings, here three different agents respond, since the episode begins with a 
restatement of the tripartite image of charioteer and two horses (253c-d). The 
sightings of beauty involve the three parts of the soul ‘seeing’ and responding to 
the beautiful boy: at 253e5 the charioteer („dèn); at 254b4 all three parts (edon); 
and at 254e8 the bad horse (‡dV). In addition sightings are implied in the general 
terms of being in contact with the boy, as the three parts are ‘near’ the boy at 
254d6 (™ggÝj Ãsan) and as the beloved is in close association with the lover at 
255b7 (plhsi£zV). The reactions and counter-reactions of the team are events 
simultaneous with the sprouting of the wing-feathers in episode three, while the 
differentiation of the soul’s parts affords a closer view of the dynamics of 
tripartition. 
The myth again draws on motifs from the lyric poets but here also diverges 
most markedly from the poetic visions of eros. Indeed in this final episode Plato 
radically rewrites the terms of the love-story he has created, setting his own vision 
in opposition to that of the poets. In the new love story of recollection self-control 
and mania are shown to be equally necessary and mutually supportive, with 
mania linked with passivity, and with self-control linked with purposive 
                                                 
113 The image of charioteer and horses is unusual amongst developed soul images in the corpus in 
that it is used only in this dialogue. Other developed images, e.g. soul as a state or the health, 
vision or nourishment of soul, occur in various contexts in different dialogues. The idea of the soul 
having wings, however, does also appear, albeit briefly, at Tim. 81e1 (™xšptato). Cf. Theaet. 
173e3-5: di£noia... pštetai. For a listing of soul metaphors across the dialogues, see Pender 
(2000), 241-57.  
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activity.114 When Plato’s lover is stimulated by the sight of the beautiful boy, two 
events are happening: the stream of beauty is entering his soul and he is recalling 
the Forms. He is thus both passive and active at once. Nightingale (1995, 158-60) 
observes how the philosophic lover’s experience follows the poetic tradition. On 
his passivity (158): ‘Like the lover of lyric poetry, Plato’s philosopher is subject to 
a massive assault both in body and in soul.’115 On his activity: Nightingale notes 
that in lyric poetry the lover is not only passively ‘invaded’ by Love but is also 
active himself, in that he pursues his beloved. And so it is with Plato’s lover (160):  
A similar combination of passivity and activity is found in Plato’s scenario, 
where the lover is passive to the extent that he is invaded by beauty, yet is active 
in his pursuit of both the boy and of the Forms.  
While this duality of experience has been analysed usefully from various angles, I 
would like to offer a new perspective on the tension and transfer of forces 
involved. Plato’s central theme in the myth is the power-dynamic within a soul 
experiencing erotic desire. In lyric poetry the lover is shown to be at the mercy of 
a greater power than himself: the god Eros. Plato reconfigures this experience 
through his own understanding of the soul and how it functions. Since the soul for 
Plato is a highly active and mobile being, the result of the impact of eros is an 
intricate picture of how energy is absorbed, transferred and redirected.  
In lyric poetry, eros is an external force. But for Plato eros exists within the 
soul, as each part of the soul can be regarded as a set of desires. Nevertheless, 
Plato follows the poetic vision by setting up a scenario whereby a lover feels the 
shock of love not simply as a result of an encounter with another person but also 
as a result of the impact of a divine force. Whereas in love poetry it is Eros or 
Aphrodite that transmits the feeling of desire to the lover, for Plato the stimulus of 
the soul’s desire is the stream of beauty. The stream of beauty is also identified as 
the stream called ‘desire’ (251c7; 255c1-2) but this is a periphrasis, since desire—
i.e. the activity of desiring something—is an internal activity of the soul, not 
something that can enter into it from outside. An external stimulus, however, 
remains necessary. For when a person falls in love, the change is not the result of 
their own will: one cannot make oneself feel erotic desire. And when an external 
stimulus stirs the lover, it is appropriate to view him as passive in the transaction. 
Thus the metaphor of beauty as a mobile stream provides a means for the static 
Form to be represented as actively impacting upon the soul, with the relationship 
modelled on poetic Eros and his passive victims. As the three parts of the soul 
react to the sight of beauty, some familiar passive motifs are continued as before: 
the radiance of the beloved (253e5 tÕ ™rwtikÕn Ômma);116 erotic heat (253e6 
                                                 
114 I follow Nussbaum’s view (1986, 213-33) that in Phaedrus both mania and reason are needed 
for the best human life, a life which is thereby ‘unstable’ (221) and ‘risky’ (232). Nussbaum’s 
influential reading shows how mania is linked with passivity and receptivity. 
115 Nightingale (1995), 160 notes that the lover is subject to forces that he cannot control, speaking 
of the philosophic lover as ‘permeable’ (159) and ‘penetrated by a variety of liquid influxes’. 
Foley (1998), 47 draws the same parallel: ‘In archaic love poetry, the lover is typically maddened 
by the forces of eros from without; streams of beauty from the beloved similarly flow into and 
arouse to madness the soul of Plato’s philosophical lover.’ 
116 On this poetic phrase, see n. 88 above and Hackforth, Rowe and de Vries ad loc.  
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diaqerm»naj); the stream of beauty (255c1 ¹ toà ·eÚmatoj ™ke…nou phg»; 
255d1 ¥rdei); and confusion (255b4 ™kpl»ttei; 255d3 ¢pore‹; 256a2 ¢porîn). 
Two further motifs connect the passage with lyric and provide a bridge between 
the passive reception of beauty and the soul’s more deliberate responses to it. The 
first of these is contact with divinity (255a1 „sÒqeoj; 255b6 œnqeon) and the 
second the movement of wings to express excitement and perfection (255c7-d2 
¢napterîsan, t¦j diÒdouj tîn pterîn... pterofue‹n; 256b4 ØpÒpteroi; 256d4 
¥pteroi... pteroàsqai; 256e1 Ðmoptšrouj). These various motifs form an 
important element of continuity both within the narrative itself and between the 
myth and the Greek literary tradition. 
When Plato turns to the subsequent reactions to beauty within the soul, the 
soul’s experiences are depicted in terms of energy and power. Whereas the soul 
was passive as it was watered and warmed by the stream of beauty, now the focus 
shifts to the animation and activity within the soul during the erotic experience. 
The established idea of the wings of the soul lies between these passive and active 
depictions, since on the one hand the wings are stimulated automatically by the 
entry of beauty, with their fluttering representing an unbidden response, but on the 
other they now furnish the soul with a form of energy that it can choose to utilise. 
Plato presents the philosophical lover as both passive and active and as he 
develops his account of the active responses he returns to the presentation of soul 
with which Socrates’ second speech began. There the tripartite soul was 
introduced as a ‘combined power’ (246a6-7 sumfÚtJ dun£mei), with its three 
different energies represented in the individual powers of the charioteer and two 
horses. In this later section of the myth Plato resumes this image in order to 
explore more fully how the energies of soul are affected by love. Here the 
dynamics established by the chariot image are scrutinised and closer attention 
paid to the force and resistance between the competing powers of driver and team. 
For this account the equestrian imagery of lyric poetry provides an established 
language for the power-relations present in the experience of eros.  
Embedded in the tripartite image itself is a judgement on which power ought 
to be dominant: the charioteer, as the leader of the team, is expected to use his 
reason, physical strength and apparatus to steer the raw energy of the animals. The 
animals supply the greater physical power but are not capable of making 
judgements about how that power is best utilised.117 The horses’ physical power is 
expressed in their pushing and dragging against the charioteer and one another as 
they seek to gallop forwards or pull backwards: Øpe…kwn; katšcei; ™ntršpetai; 
¢nagk£zei; ¢ntite…neton; poreÚesqon; biazÒmenoj; ›lkwn; ºn£gkasen; ›lkei; 
and ›petai (253e4-255a1). The charioteer’s power is conveyed through terms for 
his own movements, both voluntary and involuntary, in tension with those of the 
horses (254a7-e2): ¢ntite…neton; e‡xante; ¢nšpesen Ûpt…a; ºnagk£sqh; ™pˆ t¦ 
„sc…a... kaq…sai; ¢napesèn. In addition the charioteer uses the apparatus of 
steering: the ‘whip’ and ‘goad’ are mentioned twice (253e4 m£stigi met¦ 
kšntrwn; 254a3-4 oÜte kšntrwn ¹niocikîn oÜte m£stigoj), the reins are 
                                                 
117 Ferrari (1987), 185-203 gives a useful account of the interaction between the three parts. 
Nightingale (1995), 144-5 discusses how the forces represent ‘different kinds of logoi’.  
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highlighted at 254c1 (t¦j ¹n…aj) and the bit or bridle three times (254c6 toà 
calinoà; 254d7 tÕn calinÒn; 254e3 tÕn calinÒn).  
The force of the charioteer employed effectively in conjunction with the 
bridle is most apparent in the final subjection of the bad horse. In this critical 
moment Plato alludes to Anacreon as he draws attention to the natural power of 
the horse. But the lightness of Anacreon’s verse is destroyed as the philosopher 
parts company with the poets in showing what is really at stake in erotic 
encounters and their contest of powers. As the lover once again approaches the 
beloved, the outcome for the excited horse is grim (254d7-e5): 
Ð d' ¹n…ocoj œti m©llon taÙtÕn p£qoj paqèn, ésper ¢pÕ Ûsplhgoj 
¢napesèn, œti m©llon toà Øbristoà †ppou ™k tîn ÑdÒntwn b…v Ñp…sw 
sp£saj tÕn calinÒn, t»n te kakhgÒron glîttan kaˆ t¦j gn£qouj 
kaqÇmaxen kaˆ t¦ skšlh te kaˆ t¦ „sc…a prÕj t¾n gÁn ™re…saj ÑdÚnaij 
œdwken. 
But the same happens to the charioteer as before, only still more violently, as he 
falls back as if from a husplex; still more violently he wrenches the bit back, and 
forces it from the teeth of the unruly horse, spattering its evil-speaking tongue 
and its jaws with blood, and thrusting its legs and haunches to the ground 
delivers it over to pains. (tr. Rowe) 
This graphic picture is clearly far removed from the poetic vision of eros but 
through poetic allusions seems to stand as a deliberate response to it. In Anacreon 
417, a power-struggle is implicit as the lover observes the natural force of the 
Thracian filly and responds with his claim that his own expertise in charioteering 
would be enough to impose control on the animal (3-10): 
‡sqi toi, kalîj mn ¥n toi  
tÕn calinÕn ™mb£loimi, 
¹n…aj d' œcwn stršfoim…  
s' ¢mfˆ tšrmata drÒmou: 
nàn d leimîn£j te bÒskeai  
koàf£ te skirtîsa pa…zeij, 
dexiÕn g¦r ƒppope…rhn  
oÙk œceij ™pemb£thn. 
Let me tell you, I could neatly put the bridle on you and with the reins in my 
hand wheel you round the turnpost of the racecourse; instead, you graze in the 
meadows and frisk and frolic lightly, since you have no skilled horseman to ride 
you. (tr. Campbell) 
As a ‘skilled horseman’, in command of the ‘bridle’ and ‘reins’ the would-be lover 
is confident of his ability to exert control. The natural energy of the horse, along 
with the beloved’s sexual innocence, is evident in its playful ‘frisking’ or 
‘bounding’ in the meadow: skirtîsa. Fortenbaugh has noted Plato’s use of the 
same term—skirtîn—in describing the movement of the bad horse at 254a4 and 
concludes (1966, 109):  
The uncommon word skirt£w, which occurs in both authors, suggests 
borrowing. Plato is the only prose writer cited by LSJ to use the word, so that we 
may suspect a conscious lifting from Anacreon’s vocabulary. 
49 
E.E. PENDER, SAPPHO AND ANACREON IN PLATO’S Phaedrus 
I think Fortenbaugh is correct here and believe that this echo of Anacreon is also 
to be judged in conjunction with the poet’s direct image of charioteering in poem 
360, used for the beloved’s power over the lover: oÙk e„dëj Óti tÁj ™mÁj / 
yucÁj ¹nioceÚeij (‘... not knowing that you hold the reins of my soul’, tr. 
Campbell). Plato adopts Anacreon’s striking poetic images of bridling and the 
natural power of horses but takes them to an extreme as the horse’s brute power is 
conveyed in such terms as his ‘whinnying’ (cremet…zwn) and ‘champing at the bit’ 
(™ndakën tÕn calinÒn), and as the charioteer has to resort to bloody violence 
and pain to exert his control (254e3-4 t»n te... glîttan kaˆ t¦j gn£qouj 
kaqÇmaxen). Thus the light sexual frisson and the skittishness of Anacreon’s horse 
in 417 is pushed to an ugly conclusion.  
In sum, Plato’s relationship to the lyric tradition must be viewed as one of 
both continuity and discontinuity. While Plato remains close to the poets by 
following their depictions of the shock of love, he achieves distance from them by 
analysing this effect on the soul’s decision-making capacities. One of the key 
differences that results is that the moment of love’s impact becomes but one crisis 
in an on-going struggle. Plato adopts the lyric motif of the ‘force of eros’ to 
express the impact of the Form of Beauty but then shows how this is merely the 
first step in a transfer of energies that constitutes the experience of philosophical 
love. The clash between madness and reason is productive but unstable, requiring 
the equal force of self-control to enable improvement.  
At the close of the myth, as in the previous episode, Beauty again replaces 
poetic Eros and the ‘invasion’ is reinterpreted as a transmission of energy 
involving both passive and active responses. To express this transmission of 
energy, Plato uses a particularly distinctive lyric image for the power of eros: the 
lightning flash. As a result of drawing close to the boy at 254b, all parts of the 
soul see his face: edon t¾n Ôyin t¾n tîn paidikîn ¢str£ptousan (b4-5). His 
face ‘flashing like lightning’ recalls Ibycus 286.8, where the lightning flashes 
(sterop©j flšgwn)118 are caused by Eros appearing as Boreas, the Thracian 
storm wind.119 For Plato the lightning flash is a more threatening manifestation of 
the light of Beauty introduced in episode two at 250b. Again Plato sets his Form 
in the place of poetic Eros with the same effects: for Ibycus the lover’s heart feels 
the force of this ‘fearless’ (¢qamb»j) power; for Plato the charioteer is similarly 
vulnerable as he is terrified at the sight. ‘Seeing’ the boy makes him ‘see again’ 
Beauty, since it strikes up his memory of the awe-inspiring Form. The alliterative 
effect captures the simultaneity of seeing and fearing (254b5-7): „dÒntoj... eden... 
„doàsa d œdeise.  
Plato now presents his unique vision by depicting what follows the lightning 
bolt. The charioteer’s first reaction to the flash is simply one of shock as he falls 
back in reverence (254b8 sefqe‹sa ¢nšpesen Øpt…a). But by this very action he 
is then ‘compelled’ to exert force over the horses (254b8-c3): 
                                                 
118 LSJ on sterop»: ‘like ¢sterop», ¢strap», flash of lightning.’  
119 It is interesting to note how Ibycus’ ‘Eros as Boreas stormwind’ can be seen as a link between 
Plato’s erotic lightning flash and the mention of Boreas’ abduction of Oreithuia in the prologue.  
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kaˆ ¤ma ºnagk£sqh e„j toÙp…sw ˜lkÚsai t¦j ¹n…aj oÛtw sfÒdra, ést' 
™pˆ t¦ „sc…a ¥mfw kaq…sai të †ppw, tÕn mn ˜kÒnta di¦ tÕ m¾ 
¢ntite…nein, tÕn d Øbrist¾n m£l' ¥konta. 
... and is forced at the same time to pull back the reins so violently as to bring 
both horses down on their haunches, the one willingly, because of its lack of 
resistance to him, but the unruly horse much against its will. (tr. Rowe)  
The same reaction to the sight of the beloved occurs again at 254e1-2 and so the 
episode shows how the impetus is gained for the final bloody subjection. Ferrari’s 
insight on the charioteer’s loss of balance is most useful (1987, 189-90):  
The gesture of mastery seems more like a compulsive reaction of aversion. It is 
as if the charioteer pulls on the reins only because he is still holding them as he 
gets thrown backwards. 
Ferrari (195-7) interprets this event in terms of how the philosopher is ‘both 
captivated and yet free’ (197), since ‘by being so compelled, he is doing what he 
most wants’ (195). For my own purposes the involuntary reaction of the charioteer 
is the crucial moment at which the memory of the Form is exerting the maximum 
impact on the whole soul. Stunned at the memory the charioteer is thrown 
backwards by the force of the lightning flash. This energy is then immediately 
channelled through the reins to the horses with the result that it brings both of 
them down on their haunches. The whole team is thus felled and their combined 
power (sumfÚtJ dun£mei) capable of such speed and grace is now reduced to an 
immobile tangle of frustrated force and counter-force. Thus Plato conveys the 
shock of love on our decision-making processes. The initial energy transfer 
expressed in the lightning-flash paradoxically immobilises the moving soul but 
the crash is temporary.120 The team retreats (254c3-4) and the bad horse, once it 
gets it breath back (™xanapneÚsaj),121 soon resumes its pursuit. The good horse 
meanwhile experiences an aftershock, with an outbreak of sweat expressive of his 
trauma (254c4-5): Øp' a„scÚnhj te kaˆ q£mbouj ƒdrîti p©san œbrexe t¾n 
yuc»n. The noun q£mboj means ‘shock, fear’, and recalls Ibycus’ ¢qamb»j for 
‘fearless’ Eros, but attention is turned from the external and fearless god of lyric to 
the internal and fearful reaction of the soul. After the retreat the confrontation with 
Beauty is repeated with yet greater intensity (254e1-2 œti m©llon... œti m©llon). 
The charioteer again falls back violently and his automatic pull on the reins again 
brings the team crashing down to the ground (prÕj t¾n gÁn). The single word 
poll£kij (254e6) indicates, chillingly, that this traumatic event is a routine part 
of the philosopher’s training. Once the bad horse has been ‘humbled’ (254e7), it 
shares one part of the reaction of the good horse’s aftershock (254e7-8): Ótan ‡dV 
tÕn kalÒn, fÒbJ diÒllutai (‘when it sees the boy in his beauty it nearly dies 
with fright’, tr. Rowe).122 The verb diÒllutai (‘perish utterly’) recalls the lover’s 
stunned reaction to the sight of the beloved in Sappho 31.15: teqn£khn d' Ñl…gw. 
                                                 
120 The crash of the team here at 254c parallels their qÒruboj at 248b, with the first event 
signalling the crisis of forgetting (248c7 l»qhj) and this event the crisis of remembering. In the 
parallel story of the wings, these are the moments of loss and regrowth—the most significant 
metabolai in the narrative. 
121 Compare ¢napno»n (251e4). 
122 It cannot share the other part, the feeling of shame, since that is the province of the good horse. 
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The difference here is that the disabling effect is positive, since it allows the 
charioteer to control the horse. Plato is rewriting the love experience from the 
point of view of the tripartite soul where the power dynamics are of a uniquely 
different order.  
Here lies the crux of the transfer of energy from the impact of Beauty: the 
charioteer must allow himself to succumb passively to this force since he requires 
the upsurge in power for the effort of training his horses and himself. Thus self-
control, a concept in view since the very early speeches of the dialogue, turns out 
to be a highly complex unbalancing and re-balancing of forces. For it is the 
charioteer’s job to channel the god-given charge and redirect it to the lower parts 
of the soul so that the soul as a whole can benefit from it not only as a catalyst but 
as a sustaining stimulus for change.123 At the critical moment of the memory 
flash, the charioteer is passive but thereafter he has to take active decisions to 
invite the replay of this event and so draw from it. Thus his own decision-making 
comes into effect and his actions in directing further approaches to beauty are at 
one level controlled, deliberate and as conscious as possible of the mania that will 
ensue.  
So Plato stresses the need for self-control: physical desire must be resisted in 
order for the soul to be reunited with its true beloved. Within this wider 
framework and perspective the disabling effect of the sighting of beauty is 
positive, since it allows the charioteer to establish control over the bad horse. So it 
is made clear that the harmony and wholeness (256b1 ÐmonohtikÒn) of the soul 
ultimately rests on reason’s dominance (sophrosune), since a soul where the three 
parts are experiencing their own mania cannot be in harmony and cannot hope to 
be effective. 
But this is an understanding of self-control that recognises a significant need 
for mania. For the mania inspired by physical desire is a necessary part of the 
resistance to it, which means that the opportunities for the stirring of physical 
desire must still be courted. Since reason’s dominance is paradoxically strongest 
when it submits to the divine force of madness in the experience of desire, the 
energy of mania must be received and transformed by reason in order to create an 
equal force of self-control. In this way the charioteer requires the ‘upsurge’ in 
energy caused by love and mania as a stimulus for development. This paradox of 
Platonic love is foreshadowed in the prologue itself as the trees of chastity are 
positioned at the very focal point of the seduction meadow.124 Madness and self-
                                                 
123 Similarly, when the charioteer first receives the force of the ‘goad’, caused by the sight of 
Beauty (253e6-254a1), he is passive. When he then actively inflicts his own goad on the bad horse 
(254a3-4), he is part of a chain through which a current of energy is transmitted. As Ferrari has 
rightly commented (1987, 187), the charioteer’s action ‘directly transfers the force of the goading 
he receives from the boy’. The stream of Beauty works similarly: deriving ultimately from the 
Form, it ‘flows’ into the boy (passive) and from there into the lover’s soul (through his eyes). Once 
in the soul the charioteer (active) then transmits the energy to the bad horse (passive) through his 
driving, but the horse is simultaneously experiencing its own reactions to the erotic effects of 
beauty (active). 
124 Foley (1998), 45: ‘Phaedrus’ locus amoenus takes on a distinctly philosophical cast by being 
overshadowed by a plane tree (the name platanos may suggest Plato’s name) and the agnus castus 
(a willow-like plant associated with chastity).’ See 45 n.24: ‘Due to its supposed anti-aphrodisiac 
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control have to be balanced in the effort of recollection. The unlikely synergy 
between the two is one of the ways that Plato seeks to explain the benefits of love. 
Recollection is an effort. For it is only through controlling the irrational parts of 
the self that reason is able to find the space to concentrate undisturbed on recalling 
its dim memories of truth. The madness of erotic desire creates a crisis moment 
for the soul but through the disciplined and sober reaction of the charioteer the 
energy can be translated to produce lasting effects.  
What is most important for Plato is that disciplined effort should follow the 
mania, allowing the best inner ruler to prevail. Thus at the close of the myth the 
language of victory is used (in a direct appeal to the spirited part of the soul) in 
the simile of the Olympic games (256a7-b5): 
™¦n mn d¾ oân e„j tetagmšnhn te d…aitan kaˆ filosof…an nik»sV t¦ 
belt…w tÁj diano…aj ¢gagÒnta... ™gkrate‹j aØtîn kaˆ kÒsmioi Ôntej, 
doulws£menoi... ™leuqerèsantej... tîn triîn palaism£twn tîn æj ¢lhqîj 
'Olumpiakîn žn nenik»kasin... 
Well then, if the better elements of their minds get the upper hand by drawing 
them to a well-ordered life, and to philosophy, ... [they pass their life] masters of 
themselves and orderly in their behaviour, having enslaved that part... and freed 
that part... and have won the first of their three submissions in these, the true 
Olympic games... (tr. Rowe).  
The vocabulary here recalls that of Socrates’ first speech (237d7 ¥gonte; 237e1 
Ðmonoe‹ton; 238c3 nik»sasa ¢gwgÍ; 238e3 ¢rcomšnJ douleÚont… te) and 
indeed of Lysias’ speech with its concern with ‘self-mastery’ (231a4-5 oÙ g¦r Øp' 
¢n£gkhj ¢ll' ˜kÒntej; 231d4 oÙ dÚnasqai aØtîn krate‹n; 232a4-5 kre…ttouj 
aØtîn; 233c1-2 oÙc Øp' œrwtoj ¹ttèmenoj ¢ll' ™mautoà kratîn).125 So the 
myth concludes on the idea of the inner rulers after two very different episodes 
have together set out an array of different actions and reactions within the soul 
under the influence of beauty.  
The story of the wings and of the charioteer combine to show that recollection 
requires not simply the ‘uplift’ of remembering beauty or inspiration but also the 
more mundane development and application of reason’s control—which is why 
this episode comes last. In the imagery that Plato uses for recollection, the force 
that inspires the wings of the soul to grow must also, simultaneously, be directed 
at controlling the bad horse. For without this ‘harnessing’ of the energy through 
bit and bridle, the upsurge in energy caused by the flashing of the Form of Beauty 
will ultimately be dissipated. The mania of desire and the discipline of self-control 
                                                                                                                                     
properties, women sat on beds of agnus castus in their celebration of the religious festival for 
Demeter, the Thesmophoria.’ 
125 These concluding reflections on self-control can also be regarded as foreshadowed by the 
dramatic interplay between Socrates and Phaedrus at the start of the dialogue—where each invites 
the other to ‘lead on’ (227c1 prÒage d»; 229a7 prÒage d»; 229b3 pro£goij ¥n; cf. 228c1) and 
where each accuses the other of using force or manipulation (228c3 b…v; 228c7 sÝ oÙdamîj me 
¢f»sein; 228e4 ™ggumnasÒmenoj; 230d6-e1 ésper... ¥gousin... fa…nV peri£xein; 236b9-d3 e„j 
t¦j Ðmo…aj lab¦j ™l»luqaj... eÙlab»qhti... m¾... ¢nagk£sai... prÕj b…an; 236d7 ¢nagk£sw; 
236e4 t¾n ¢n£gkhn). In this way, as the dialogue progresses, the topic of control by external 
forces gives way to that of self-control and internal forces. 
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are shown as mutually supportive since the narrative unfolds to show how the 
regrowth of the wing relies not only on erotic stimulation but also on the training 
of the three parts of the soul. Thus recollection requires both a concentration of 
energy and insight (imaged in elevation and outwardly directed towards the 
Forms) and at the same time an increase in control (imaged in bridle and goad and 
inwardly directed within the soul). In this way the concept of inner rule is shown 
to be an unexpected balance of forces and energies in which deliberate 
unbalancing plays a necessary part. 
6. Conclusion 
As Plato sets out his account of the soul in love he draws directly on the 
poetic language of the lyric poets. But he sets against them a need for self-control 
to redirect the soul’s energy from physical beauty to the Forms. Anacreon’s lover 
(417) would like to engage in sex with the filly and so impose a form of control 
on its natural energy. While the bad horse feels the same urge for sex, as a result 
of training he accepts restraint and thus all three figures unite in holding back 
from physical sex. The energy of the horses is thus used to assist the charioteer in 
remembering the Forms. Although the horses cannot remember the Forms, since 
they have not seen them, they can serve the needs of reason by helping the whole 
soul adopt the right attitude towards the beloved—i.e. treating him with reverence 
and awe—and so supporting the effort of recollection. Plato offers a graphic 
picture of the subjugation of the bad horse that is far removed from the poetic 
vision of eros and stands as a deliberate response to it. But allusions to the poets 
are integral to this response.  
Plato shows eros from the differing points of view of black horse and 
charioteer and so inverts the subjection: a Platonic lover would not subject the 
Thracian filly to control because the ‘bad horse’ in the lover’s soul would already 
be subjected. Anacreon’s lover in 360 has lost his self-control since the boy is now 
the charioteer of his soul. But for Plato the lover is either free or subjected as a 
result only of the forces within his own soul. Plato equally uses Sapphic allusions 
but again for very different purposes. The lover’s soul is as dumbstruck at the 
sight of beauty as Sappho’s lover is at the sight of her beloved in poem 31. But 
Plato tells what has to happen after Sappho 31—allowing the moment but 
signalling what subsequent action is needed to achieve recollection. While the text 
does seem to draw on Sappho’s insight into memory as a means of overcoming 
distance and loss, in Phaedrus memory does not serve as a consolation but as a 
spur to further effort—it is merely the beginning of an arduous task. Burnett 
stresses that memory in Sappho is a ‘disciplined mental process’ (1983, 290) but 
still its ultimate aim is consolation.126 In contrast, recollection in Phaedrus leads 
to a situation where the bad horse is subjected to severe physical pain; the good 
horse is terrified, and the charioteer can only enforce his will through the violent 
jolt he himself receives at the lightning bolt of beauty. Although the results of 
                                                 
126 See duBois (1995), 138-40 and Foley (1998), 54: ‘Sappho’s fragmentary poems like 94 or 96 
gently lead her interlocutors to a new perspective on the pain of erotic loss that aims both to re-
envision and to assuage it.’ 
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success will be pleasant—the blessed vision is viewed by a ‘happy company’ 
(250b6 eÙda…moni corù)—even then diligence, effort and sweat are necessary, 
sweat brought on not by an outside stimulus but by inner exertion.  
To conclude, Plato’s picture of the soul in love in Phaedrus is ultimately at 
odds with the charis of lyric poetry. For Plato rewrites the love experience from 
the point of view of the tripartite soul, offering a new and unique vision of the 
power-dynamics involved when a soul responds to the beloved’s beauty. But 
nevertheless Plato pays tribute to the lyric poets not only at 235c but also, and 
indeed more directly, in his allusions to their verses. His tribute is to acknowledge 
that Sappho and Anacreon have powerfully captured and expressed the moment of 
being ‘love-struck’. However, his necessary distance from the poets becomes 
evident since this crucial moment, important as it is, is merely a single crisis in a 
long-term struggle. Thus through his love story of recollection Plato challenges 
the lyric tradition by placing eros within a much larger framework of experience 
and understanding. In this way the destabilising force of love is revealed as 
surprisingly central in the contest of powers that defines human life. 
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